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One of the most remarkable outcomes of the American Civil 
Rights movement of the twentieth century was the highly prominent 
role played by the federal judiciary.  The federal judiciary, which 
stands as the ultimate symbol of American power, values, justice, and 
prestige, was tasked with the privilege of unifying the disjointed 
groups of people who comprised the United States.1  Through the 
desegregation cases, the federal judiciary ushered in the use of the 
civil rights injunction in the American legal system.  In courts of equi-
ty, an injunction is a remedy that requires a party to a case to cease or 
perform a specific act, or face criminal or civil penalties for failing to 
cooperate.2  Through the highly lauded Brown v. Board of Education3 
(“Brown I”) case and its progeny, the federal courts used such equita-
ble principles as the guide to shape school desegregation decrees.  
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With these developments to the federal bench, the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment4 became the primary instru-
ment the federal judiciary used to reform and reshape American so-
ciety. 
Brown I is one of the most highly celebrated opinions in American 
jurisprudence.  We recognize today the sixtieth anniversary of the de-
cision that heralded the promise of equality in educational opportu-
nities that would serve to dismantle the system of oppression and le-
gally sanctioned apartheid in this country.  It was believed that 
through the holding, which guaranteed access to high quality educa-
tion to all on equal terms, free of the stigma of racial identification, 
that the harms done to the hearts and minds of children subjected to 
such systems would not only secure their position in American socie-
ty, but would also elevate all Americans. 
However, in spite of the celebration of the power of the federal 
judiciary to attempt to advance the charge of equality among all men 
guaranteed by the Declaration of Independence, the reality of the 
impact of the desegregation cases is starkly grim.5  Sixty years after 
striking down the legal precedent of racially separate but equal facili-
ties and accommodations, American public schools have remained 
racially polarized and woefully unequal. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education of To-
peka (“Brown II”), which was intended to be a remedial counterpart to 
Brown I, allowed the defendant school districts, who were the identi-
fied wrongdoers, the unique authority to provide their own solutions 
to the issue of school desegregation.6  Rather than ordering a decree 
of a national standard of school integration, the Court ordered local 
school boards to devise the remedies that would redress the harms 
inflicted upon the plaintiffs.  “School authorities have the primary re-
sponsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these [school de-
segregation] problems . . . .”7  The Supreme Court also charged lower 
 
 4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (stating that no State shall “deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”) 
 5 The terms “integration” and “desegregation” will be used interchangeably throughout 
this Article.  For a more thorough discussion on the legal differences and social 
implications of the two terms, see generally Erica Frankenberg, School Segregation, 
Desegregation, and Integration:  What Do These Terms Mean in a Post-Parents Involved in 
Community Schools, Racially Transitioning Society?, 6 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 533 (2007). 
 6 See Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights:  The Case of Housing and 
Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1403 (1998) (discussing that when civil rights litigants 
must depend on the government actor wrongdoers for relief, the government becomes 
the primary enforcement vehicle for civil rights, “[a]nd yet, for a variety of reasons, the 
government has failed to play a strong role as an enforcement agency” for civil rights). 
 7 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955). 
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federal district courts with the responsibility to determine whether 
the defendants fulfilled their duties toward integration based on local 
community standards:  “[C]ourts will have to consider whether the 
action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of 
the governing constitutional principles.  Because of their proximity to 
local conditions and the possible need for further hearings, the 
courts which originally heard these cases can best perform this judi-
cial appraisal.”8 
The federal judiciary experienced great difficulty with the en-
forcement of desegregation orders.  Therefore, by 1991, the Supreme 
Court determined that school desegregation lawsuits were not to be 
maintained by lower courts indefinitely.  As a consequence of the Su-
preme Court’s urgings to eliminate desegregation orders as soon as 
possible, federal district courts have declared many districts “unitary” 
and have returned the schools to local control.  A study conducted of 
federal district court opinions and the appeals of those decisions 
found that in the decade from 1992 to 2002 all but one request to the 
court for unitary status was granted.9 
Concurrent with school districts’ attempts to integrate schools 
through judicial orders, many districts, recognizing the value of stu-
dents attending desegregated schools, chose to pursue voluntary in-
tegration methods.10  However, in 2007, the Supreme Court in Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 struck down 
voluntary integration plans in effect by Seattle, Washington and Jef-
ferson County, Kentucky public schools.11  While districts under court 
order to desegregate were not directly affected by this legal ruling, 
several districts ceased their voluntary integration plans as a result.  
The question remains:  What are the academic consequences to chil-
dren as a result of the Supreme Court’s further insistence on the abo-
lition of desegregation efforts? 
Although there have been numerous studies conducted to deter-
mine the resegregation levels of districts that have been declared uni-
 
 8 Id. 
 9 See Wendy Parker, The Decline of Judicial Decisionmaking: School Desegregation and District 
Court Judges, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1623, 1623 (2003) (examining and analyzing all federal 
district court opinions concerning school desegregation from June 1, 1992 to June 1, 
2002); id. at 1633 (noting a case in which a school district in Pennsylvania was declared 
only partially unitary, despite its request for full unitary status). 
 10 See, e.g., FREDERICK M. WIRT, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE NORTH: THE CHALLENGE 
AND THE EXPERIENCE 116-28 (1967) (describing various voluntary desegregation efforts). 
 11 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 747–748 (2007). 
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tary,12 there exists a paucity of data that considers the academic 
achievement of students who attend schools in these “unitary” dis-
tricts.  This Article considers the high school graduation rates among 
students in school districts in which federal courts have decided uni-
tary status cases since 2007. 
Part I considers the impact of the Parents Involved case on volun-
tary efforts toward school integration.  Part II considers how Brown I 
and its progeny evolved into the jurisprudence followed by the mod-
ern judiciary.  Parts III and IV consider all of the cases that have been 
before the federal bench since 2007 with motions for unitary status 
consideration, and the district wide graduation rates of students in 
those districts.  Part V concludes with outcomes that federal judges 
should consider when making unitary status determinations, and the 
educational and societal impacts of their decisions. 
I. PARENTS MAY BE INVOLVED, BUT SCHOOL DISTRICTS MAY NOT 
VOLUNTARILY BE INVOLVED 
MR. RANKIN [on behalf of the United States]:  And the whole concept 
of constitutional law is that those rights that are defined and set out in 
the Constitution are not to be subject to the political form which changes 
from time to time, but are to be preserved under the holdings of this 
Court over many, many years by the orders of this Court granting the re-
lief prayed for.13 
School desegregation and its validity, while debated vociferously 
with regard to our modern-day school configurations, has been the 
subject of judicial and legislative scrutiny for over a century.14  The 
 
 12 See e.g., Jennifer B. Ayscue et al., Segregation Again:  North Carolina’s Transition from Leading 
Desegregation Then to Accepting Segregation Now, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, REPORT NO. 6 
(2014), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/
integration-and-diversity/segregation-again-north-carolina2019s-transition-from-leading-
desegregation-then-to-accepting-segregation-now/Ayscue-Woodward-Segregation-Again-
2014.pdf (investigating trends in school segregation in North Carolina over the past two 
decades). 
 13 Transcript of Oral Argument, Briggs v. Elliot, 342 U.S. 350 (1952), quoted in BROWN V. 
BOARD: THE LANDMARK ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 244 (Leon 
Friedman ed., 2004). 
 14 Between 1850 and 1883, several high courts in northern states addressed the validity of 
school segregation against state and federal constitutional attack.  See, e.g., Ward v. Flood, 
48 Cal. 36, 37 (1874) (holding that black children may be excluded from schools 
established for white children, provided that a separate school of equal facilities has been 
established for black children); Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 356–57 (1874) (holding that a 
classification of students based on race is constitutional as long as it does not exclude a 
particular race from equal school advantages); Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198, 
198 (5 Cush. 1849) (holding that the general school committee of Boston had the power 
to make provision for the instruction of colored children in separate schools); State ex rel. 
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storied history behind the attempts at racial integration of children in 
schools in the United States is one that tells the tale of the interplay 
between legislative, social, and judicial confluences, in a country 
where ideological agreement is rarely found among the three 
branches. 15  The result of the convergence has led to periods of time 
 
Stoutmeyer v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342, 348  (1872) (holding that the Nevada Constitution 
requires that all resident children between the ages of six and eighteen, regardless of 
race, be granted admission to Nevada public schools, but that it is entirely within the 
power of the school trustees “to send all blacks to one school, and all whites to 
another . . . .”); People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 451 (1883) (holding that 
where the right to secure equal educational advantages is afforded by the school 
authorities, an individual “cannot justly claim that his educational privileges have been 
abridged” merely because he does not receive his education where he most desires to 
receive it); State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198, 202 (1871) (holding that an 
Act authorizing separate-but-equal public schools for black schoolchildren did not violate 
the Equal Protection Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, nor did the Act contravene the Ohio Constitution).  Four courts invalidated 
segregation under state law.  See Chase v. Stephenson, 71 Ill. 383, 385 (1874) (holding 
that all children within a school district, regardless of race or color, shall have the equal 
right to participate in the benefits of the public schools and school directors have no 
power to discriminate between students on account of their color, race, or social 
position); Clark v. Bd. of Dirs., 24 Iowa 266, 267 (1868) (holding that the state 
constitutional provision providing “for the education of all the youths of the State” 
through a system of common schools precludes the school board from denying admission 
to an otherwise eligible student on the basis of race and precludes the board from 
compelling a black student to attend a separate school for black children); Bd. of Educ. v. 
Tinnon, 26 Kan. 1, 18 (1881) (holding that the ultimate question of whether states have 
the power to impose school segregation can only be decided by the Supreme Court and 
that, even if such power exists, the Kansas legislature has not clearly conferred it to the 
state school boards); People ex rel. Workman v. Bd. of Educ. of Detroit, 18 Mich. 400, 
409–10 (1869) (holding that a state act providing that “[a]ll residents of any district shall 
have an equal right to attend any school therein” is applicable to the city of Detroit and 
prohibits the school board from excluding a resident from any of its schools on account 
of color).  In 1871, the District of Columbia Committee of the United States Senate 
proposed a bill to eliminate racial segregation in public schools within the District of 
Columbia.  Proponents of the bill insisted that this was required by the equality principle 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  While the opponents of the bill did not argue the 
alternative, the bill never passed to a vote before the Senate.  This resulted in Congress’ 
continued funding of a segregated school system.  See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d. Sess. 
1054 (1871); ROBERT HARRISON, WASHINGTON DURING CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION: 
RACE AND RADICALISM 138–40 (2011) (describing the controversial impact of Senator 
Charles Sumner’s insistence on school integration in Congress and indicating, most 
notably, that despite Congressional inaction, Senator Sumner introduced a school 
integration bill every year from 1871 until his death in 1874). 
 15 Compare Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 487 (1982) (invalidating a 
statute under the Equal Protection Clause, enacted by a majority of the state of 
Washington’s citizens, that prohibited racially integrative busing as a means to integrate 
schools), with Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Unintended Lessons in Brown v. Board of Education, 
49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1053, 1056 (2005) (“Brown was not a revolutionary decision.  
Rather, it is the definitive example that the interest of blacks in achieving racial justice is 
accommodated only when and for so long as policymakers find that the interest of blacks 
converges with the political and economic interests of whites.”). 
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where racial integration was sought, and periods where such an ideal 
has been considered veritably impossible.16  Yet, sixty years after the 
Supreme Court unanimously17 decided the seminal case of the twen-
tieth century, decrying the adverse impact of racially separate schools 
on the future health of our nation,18 American public schools remain 
grossly unequal and woefully separate.19  In spite of ongoing public 
recognition20 of the significance of the decision to the judiciary, legis-
 
 16 Compare Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439–40 (1968) (holding that racially 
segregated schools within a school system do not necessarily violate the Constitution, but 
that a school district’s “freedom of choice” plan was not enough in itself to achieve 
desegregation), with Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233–34 (1964) (holding that 
the closure of schools to avoid desegregation was in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 17 See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE:  THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND 
BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 696 (1976) (discussing the roles of Chief 
Justice Earl Warren and Justice Felix Frankfurter in assuring a unanimous result); 
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF:  EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT—A JUDICIAL 
BIOGRAPHY 95 (1983) (“If anyone worked for a unified Court to strike down segregation, 
it was Frankfurter . . . . [He] cooperated closely with the new Chief [Justice Earl Warren] 
in securing Court unanimity.”).  See also Brad Snyder & John Q. Barrett, Rehnquist’s 
Missing Letter: A Former Law Clerk’s 1955 Thoughts on Justice Jackson and Brown, 53 B.C. L. 
REV. 631, 632 (2012) (discussing William Rehnquist’s advice to Justice Jackson during the 
1952 Brown oral arguments, that Plessy v. Ferguson should be affirmed) (citing 
Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist to Justice Robert H. Jackson, A Random 
Thought on the Segregation Cases (1952), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/rights/sources_document7.html). 
 18 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Today, education is perhaps the most 
important function of state and local governments.  Compulsory school attendance laws 
and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the 
importance of education to our democratic society.  It is required in the performance of 
our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces.  It is the very 
foundation of good citizenship.  Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child 
to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to 
adjust normally to his environment.  In these days, it is doubtful that any child may 
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. 
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must 
be made available to all on equal terms.”). 
 19 Gary Orfield, Genevieve Siegel-Hawley & John Kucsera, Sorting Out Deepening Confusion on 
Segregation Trends, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT 1, 7 (2014), available at 
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-
diversity/sorting-out-deepening-confusion-on-segregation-trends/Segregation-Trends-
Dispute-CRP-Researchers.pdf (“When it comes to segregation measures, known as the 
exposure and isolation indices . . . black students [since 1989 have] increasingly attended 
schools with disproportionally low shares of whites . . . .”).  But see Sean Reardon & Ann 
Owens, 60 Years After Brown: Trends and Consequences of School Segregation 40 ANN. REV. SOC. 
199, 213 (2014), available at http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-
soc-071913-043152 (concluding that the changes in school segregation patterns in the last 
few decades are not as dramatic as social scientists may purport). 
 20 To mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Brown decision, the U.S. Departments of Justice 
and Education, several law schools, and other social, civic, and government organizations 
sponsored commemorative activities to honor the impact of the decision on the 
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lature, and the social mores of our country, the promise that Brown I 
held and the harms that the decision sought to remedy—that were 
inflicted upon the courageous plaintiffs and the classes represent-
ed—21have yet to be fully realized in practice.22 
After over half a century of attempting to implement Brown I and 
find common ground among those who advocate integration and 
those who reject judicially ordered integration, all while at least os-
tensibly honoring Brown I’s legacy,23 in 2007 the Supreme Court is-
 
American way of life.  The following is a short sampling of such events:  April 2, 2004, 
Virginia Historical Society, Before and After Brown in Virginia; April 8-May 2, 2004, 
Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, Judge Damon Keith’s Marching Toward 
Justice Exhibit on Brown v. Board of Education (later to be on display at Howard University 
School of Law from May 17, 2004 through the summer); April 13, 2004, UMBC 
Department of American Studies, panel presentation on “Reflections on the Brown 
Decision:  African American Experience and Schooling in Baltimore County”; April 14, 
2004, Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, a panel discussion:  “Brown v. Board of 
Education:  Yesterday and Today”; April 15 & 16, 2004, Georgetown University Law 
Center, Bolling v. Sharpe at 50:  Desegregation in the District of Columbia:  Past, Present, 
and Future; May 10, 2004, “Unfinished Business:  Keeping the Promise of Brown v. Board 
of Education,” sponsored by Institute for Educational Leadership, The Century 
Foundation, and The Center for American Progress; May 13, 2004, Library of Congress 
Exhibit on Brown v. Board of Education; May 13, 2004, Department of Justice, Brown v. 
Board of Education 50th Anniversary Commemoration; May 13–14, 2004, University of Kansas, 
Conference on Fifty Years after Brown v. Board of Education:  Social Psychological Research 
Applied to the Problems of Racism and Discrimination.  Outside  Events,  BROWN@50:  FUL
FILLING  THE  PROMISE, http://www.brownat50.org/brownevents/
BrownEventsOthers.htm. 
 21 See ROBERT CARTER, A MATTER OF LAW:  A MEMOIR OF STRUGGLE IN THE CAUSE OF EQUAL 
RIGHTS 132 (2005) (indicating the rights of the victorious Brown litigants were never truly 
realized because none of the original plaintiffs in the South Carolina, Kansas, or Virginia 
cases ever attended an unsegregated school, which demonstrates that the educational 
opportunities Brown I required and the speediness Brown II insisted upon were never 
enforced, even in the instances of the nationally highlighted plaintiffs). 
 22 Even as the nation heralded the fiftieth anniversary of the Brown I decision, rates of 
integration were declining.  In 1970, black students typically attended schools where 
enrollment was 32% white.  By 2010, black students typically attended schools that were 
only 29% white.  Gary Orfield, John Kucsera & Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, E Pluribus . . . 
Separation:  Deepening Double Segregation for More Students, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, 22 fig. 3, 
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-
diversity/mlk-national/e-pluribus . . . separation-deepening-double-segregation-for-more 
students/orfield_epluribus_revised_omplete_2012.pdf (last updated Oct. 18, 2012). 
 23 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 842 (2007) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“And it was Brown . . . that affected so deeply not only Americans 
but the world.”); Hampton v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 379 (W.D. 
Ky. 2000) (“Brown and its progeny established a moral imperative to eradicate racial 
injustice in the public schools.”).  See also KLUGER, supra note 17, at x (arguing that no 
other Supreme Court opinion has “affected more directly the minds, hearts, and daily 
lives of so many Americans”).  See also Mark A. Graber, The Price of Fame:  Brown as 
Celebrity, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 939, 940 (2008) (“Presently invoked to support every popular 
decision on racial inequality, the 1954 school segregation cases no longer stand for any 
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sued its first school desegregation case in over a decade.24  Parents In-
volved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, and its com-
panion case Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education (hereinafter 
Parents Involved),25 addressed the extent to which a school district can 
use race to desegregate.  The issues in this case starkly divided the 
Court, whereby five opinions were rendered, none garnering a major-
ity.26  In this highly fractured decision, the Court struck down race-
based student assignments used by districts attempting to voluntarily 
integrate schools.27  The Court’s ruling maintained that the Four-
teenth Amendment places different standards on the use of race-
based student assignments in schools that are under court order to 
desegregate, as opposed to those that choose to voluntarily integrate 
students and are not subject to mandatory desegregation plans.28 
 
contested proposition or are identified in any distinctive way with the civil rights 
movement.  Brown, like Paris Hilton, is now famous largely for being famous.”). 
 24 See Graber, supra note 23, at 939 (indicating that, prior to 2007, the Rehnquist and 
Roberts Supreme Courts rarely cited Brown I or Brown II for any significant legal 
proposition, and almost never did so after George W. Bush took office in 2001). 
 25 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701. 
 26 Chief Justice John Roberts’ opinion garnered agreement by Justices Antonin Scalia, 
Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito.  Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissent obtained the 
consent of Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and David Souter.  Justice 
Anthony Kennedy’s opinion, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, has 
been considered the controlling opinion in this case.  See id. 
 27 Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this instance, there were previous 
cases in which lower courts were required to consider the constitutionality of voluntary 
integration plans that considered race.  See, e.g., Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. 
Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 746–53 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the reduction of racial isolation 
resulting from de facto segregation can be a compelling state interest in denying a 
requested preliminary injunction directing the school district to allow a white student to 
transfer from a city school district to a suburban school district in spite of a state-
administered interdistrict transfer program); Tuttle v. Arlington Cnty. Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 
698, 701 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that the weighted admissions policy for a public, 
alternative school, which considered applicants’ races and ethnicities, was not narrowly 
tailored to achieve an allegedly compelling interest in attaining diversity); Hunter ex rel. 
Brandt v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the 
consideration of race or ethnicity in the admissions process at an elementary school did 
not violate the Equal Protection Clause); Ho v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 854, 865 
(9th Cir. 1998) (holding that public schools that denied enrollment to students of 
Chinese descent through the use of racial classification and a quota system set forth in a 
1983 consent desegregation decree must demonstrate at trial that:  (1) the “vestiges” of 
racism sufficiently remain to justify the ethnically-based limitations in the consent decree; 
and (2) the limitations are narrowly tailored to remove such vestiges); Wessmann v. 
Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 792 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that an admissions policy that makes 
race a determining factor in the admission of a subset of each year’s incoming classes was 
not justified either on the basis of asserted governmental interest in diversity, or as means 
of redressing vestiges of past discrimination). 
 28 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 702–03 (“Although remedying the effects of past intentional 
discrimination is a compelling interest under the strict scrutiny test, that interest is not 
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Reviewing the student assignment plans under strict scrutiny, the 
Parents Involved Court maintained that the school districts had to 
demonstrate that the use of racial classifications in their student as-
signment plans were narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling gov-
ernmental interest.  The Court held that school districts’ stated goal 
of remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination could not 
serve as a compelling interest to justify their use of race-based classifi-
cations when making student assignments and student transfer de-
terminations.  The Court distinguished that remedying the effects of 
past intentional discrimination is a compelling interest for districts 
under court order to desegregate, but such interests were impermis-
sible under strict scrutiny for districts that were not required by law to 
desegregate.29  Further, the Justices held that the districts’ goal of fos-
tering increased educational and broader socialization benefits 
through racially diverse learning environments that were linked to 
racial demographics and not to any identified pedagogical goal was 
impermissible, and thereby unconstitutional.30  The Court was clear 
to indicate that the districts’ reliance on the Court’s prior ruling of a 
compelling interest in diversity in higher education31 could not justify 
the kindergarten through twelfth grade school districts’ use of race 
for student assignments under the Equal Protection Clause.32 
 
involved here because the Seattle schools were never segregated by law nor subject to 
court-ordered desegregation, and the desegregation decree to which the Jefferson 
County schools were previously subject has been dissolved.”) (citation omitted). 
 29 Id. at 720–21. 
 30 Id. at 725–27. 
 31 See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (“When race-based action is 
necessary to further a compelling governmental interest, such action does not violate the 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection so long as the narrow-tailoring requirement 
is also satisfied.”). 
 32 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 723 (2007) (“The 
point of the narrow tailoring analysis in which the Grutter Court engaged was to ensure 
that the use of racial classifications was indeed part of a broader assessment of diversity, 
and not simply an effort to achieve racial balance, which the Court explained would be 
patently unconstitutional.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Id. at 724 (“In 
upholding the admissions plan in Grutter, though, this Court relied upon considerations 
unique to institutions of higher education . . . ”).  However, the Court in Brown I, relying 
on the Supreme Court’s prior desegregation decisions in higher education, did not 
distinguish the benefits of desegregation for students in institutions of higher education 
from those for students in elementary and high schools.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483, 491–92 (1954), (“In more recent cases [heard by this Court], all on the graduate 
school level, inequality was found in that specific benefits enjoyed by white students were 
denied to Negro students of the same educational qualifications.”). 
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If a school district is obviously segregated, but a judge does not say 
it is segregated, is it segregated?33  In this decision, the Court posited 
the distinction between the responsibilities of school districts that are 
required to desegregate by judicial order and the rights of those that 
choose to do so voluntarily due to a finding that students benefit 
from being educated in a diverse educational setting.34  There was 
great disagreement among the Justices as to whether Seattle schools 
operated de jure35 segregated schools.36  Justice Roberts maintained 
that Seattle had never legally operated segregated schools, nor was it 
ever subjected to court-ordered desegregation; therefore, all of its de-
segregation efforts were strictly voluntary.37  Alternatively, the dissent 
 
 33 A variation of the colloquial philosophical thought experiment, “If a tree falls in a forest 
and no one is around to hear it fall, does it make a sound?” that raises questions 
regarding observation and acknowledgment of reality. 
 34 Since Brown I was decided, courts have responded to the issue of whether the Brown 
mandates apply solely to districts that segregate by order of the law, de jure segregation, 
or whether districts in which social norms perpetuate segregation, de facto segregation, 
are also subject to Brown.  Parents Involved was the first time, however, that the Supreme 
Court, in evaluating the constitutionality of race-based desegregation policies, noted a 
distinction between districts obligated to desegregate by court order and districts that 
choose to voluntarily desegregate.  Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 702–03.  See, e.g., Taylor v. 
Bd. of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181, 192–93 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff’d, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961) 
(“I see no basis to draw a distinction, legal or moral, between segregation established by 
the formality of a dual system of education, as in Brown, and that created by 
gerrymandering of school district lines and transferring of white children as in the instant 
case.  The result is the same in each case:  the conduct of responsible school officials has 
operated to deny to Negro children the opportunities for a full and meaningful 
educational experience guaranteed to them by the 14th Amendment. . . . Having created 
a segregated school, the Constitution imposed upon the Board the duty to end 
segregation, in good faith, and with all deliberate speed.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 35 For purposes of this Article, districts that have been declared unitary yet still have 
segregated schools are considered to be de facto segregated because the distinction of 
being declared unitary presumes that the discriminatory intent to segregate students has 
been removed “root and branch” in the district.  See Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 
437–38 (1968).  See also, Swann v. Charlotte–Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17–18 
(1971) (noting de facto segregation is present “where racial imbalance exists in the 
schools but with no showing that this was brought about by discriminatory action of state 
authorities”); Parent Ass’n of Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 712–13 
(2d Cir. 1979) (affirming a district court’s finding that, what the panel labeled as de facto 
segregation of the school, “resulted from population changes” in the surrounding 
neighborhoods). 
 36 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 749 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Because this Court has 
authorized and required race-based remedial measures to address de jure segregation, it is 
important to define segregation clearly and to distinguish it from racial imbalance.  In 
the context of public schooling, segregation is the deliberate operation of a school system 
to ‘carry out a governmental policy to separate pupils in schools solely on the basis of 
race.’. . . Racial imbalance is the failure of a school district’s individual schools to match 
or approximate the demographic makeup of the student population at large.”) (citation 
omitted). 
 37 Id. at 712 (plurality opinion). 
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argued that in 1966 plaintiffs in Seattle filed a federal lawsuit claim-
ing unconstitutional segregation on the part of the Seattle School 
Board.38  The complaint alleged that the school board created a seg-
regated school system by drawing boundary lines and enforcing 
school attendance policies that created and maintained predominate-
ly separate white and black schools.  The complaint also charged that 
the board discriminated in assigning teachers. 39  The parties in the 
case settled after the school district pledged to undertake a desegre-
gation plan that included race-based transfers and mandatory student 
busing.40  Although Jefferson County had been found to maintain a 
segregated school system,41 after over 25 years, the district was de-
clared unitary in 2000 and relieved of its duty to operate under a de-
segregation order.42 
In spite of the lack of clarity by all of the Parents Involved Justices as 
to whether desegregative remedies should be enforceable only in de 
jure segregated districts solely as opposed to both de jure and de fac-
to segregated schools, Brown I appears to settle the issue.43  The War-
ren Court in Brown I was very explicit in its holding that: 
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a 
detrimental effect upon the colored children.  The impact is greater when it 
has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually 
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the Negro group.  A sense of in-
feriority affects the motivation of a child to learn.44 
Although the Warren Court indicated that the harms imposed on 
students in segregated school environments were greater when seg-
regation had the authority of the law behind it, the Warren Court 
never indicated that the harms that resulted from receiving educa-
tion in segregated schools were exclusively inflicted upon children 
attending schools that were lawfully segregated.  This lack of distinc-
tion between de jure and de facto segregation by the Brown I Court 
 
 38 Id. at 808 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 39 Id. at 809 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 40 Id. at 806–09 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 41 See Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 489 F.2d 925, 931 (6th Cir. 1973). 
 42 See Hampton v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 382 (W.D. Ky. 2000). 
 43 See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208–09 (1973) (holding that, absent laws 
requiring school segregation, plaintiffs must prove intentional segregative acts affecting a 
substantial part of the school system); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495 (1992) (“Where 
resegregation is a product not of state action but of private choices, it does not have 
constitutional implications.”).  This approach is consistent with the Supreme Court cases 
that maintain when facially neutral laws  have a discriminatory impact, proof of 
discriminatory purpose is necessary to show an equal protection violation.  See, e.g., 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that discriminatory impact devoid of 
discriminatory intent is insufficient to prove a racial classification). 
 44 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 482, 494 (1954) (emphasis added). 
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and the harms that are inflicted upon students who attend segregated 
schools should have been significant to the Parents Involved Court that 
relied heavily upon Brown I to base its decision.45  Further, while Jus-
tice Breyer in his dissent acknowledged the legal distinction between 
de jure and de facto segregation, he aptly points out that “[the] dis-
tinction concerns what the Constitution requires school boards to do, 
not what it permits them to do.”46 
The impact of this distinction is great47 in that Parents Involved 
forecloses districts that have been declared unitary48 or those that 
recognize the benefits of diversity in their schools from engaging in 
racially-based student assignments.  For de facto systems, the control-
ling Parents Involved opinion interpreted the Equal Protection Clause 
as prohibiting the use of overt racial classifications in voluntary de-
segregation programs.49  In effect, Parents Involved maintains that if a 
school district identifies harms to students that Brown I found uncon-
stitutional,50 it may not engage in the self-correction remedies51 that 
 
 45 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 705 (2007) 
(indicating that it was not the inequality of facilities that Brown found unconstitutional 
but the fact of legally separating children based on race). 
 46 Id. at 844 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 47 But see James Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV. 131, 
132–33 (2007) (positing that the Parents Involved decision will not change much in the 
landscape of school desegregation). 
 48 Unitary status denotes the end of school desegregation litigation and the case is usually 
dismissed.  Once a school district is declared unitary, it is assumed that schools in the 
district have removed the stigma of being “black” or “white” schools.  See Green v. Cnty. 
Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968) (“The Board must be required to formulate a new plan 
and . . . fashion steps which promise realistically to convert promptly to a system without a 
‘white’ school and a ‘Negro’ school, but just schools.”); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 
U.S. 237, 246 (1991) (“Courts have used . . . ‘unitary’ to describe a school system which 
has been brought into compliance with the command of the Consitution.”).  However, 
the existence of racially homogeneous schools within school systems will not necessarily 
bar a school district from being declared unitary.  See Swann v. Charlotte–Mecklenburg 
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1971); Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 702 F.2d 1221, 
1226 (5th Cir. 1983) (“It is axiomatic that the existence of a few racially homogeneous 
schools within a school system is not per se offensive to the Constitution.”). 
 49 Citing that the districts in this case were not judicially mandated to comply with a 
desegregation order, the Court maintained that “[t]he justification for race conscious 
remedies . . . is therefore not applicable here.”  Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 737. 
 50 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494, 494 (1954) (“We must look instead to the effect 
of segregation itself on public education. . . . To separate [students] from others of 
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority 
as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way 
unlikely ever to be undone.”). 
 51 But see Swann, 402 U.S. at 16 (“School authorities are traditionally charged with broad 
power to formulate and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for 
example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school 
should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for 
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would be judicially allowable if a judge were to find such harms pre-
sent.  While the Parents Involved Court did little to upend the equal 
protection precedents that uphold the use of race-conscious policies 
for school districts judicially ordered to follow desegregation decrees, 
the Court did emphasize that “[e]ven in the context of mandatory 
desegregation, we have stressed that racial proportionality is not re-
quired . . . .”52 
In maintaining differing standards for de jure and de facto segre-
gated districts for ensuring schoolwide diversity, the Parents Involved 
Court made an ideological reversal from several decades of jurispru-
dence that extended substantial deference to local school board au-
thority, particularly as it relates to setting school desegregation policy 
issues for districts under court mandate to desegregate.53  The Rob-
erts opinion indicates “[s]uch deference [toward local authorities] ‘is 
fundamentally at odds with our equal protection jurisprudence.’”54  
Citing Richmond v. Croson,55 the Court stated that “[t]he history of ra-
cial classifications in this country suggests that blind judicial defer-
ence to legislative or executive pronouncements of necessity has no 
 
the district as a whole.  To do this as an educational policy is within the broad 
discretionary powers of school authorities; absent a finding of a constitutional violation, 
however, that would not be within the authority of a federal court.”); Parent Ass’n of 
Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 713 (2d Cir. 1979) (“It is 
permissible, accordingly, for local officials to attempt voluntarily to correct or combat 
such an imbalance at a slower pace than would be satisfactory for a school or district 
under a court order to dismantle a dual system[.]”(internal citation omitted)).  
 52 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 732 (2007). 
 53 See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 138 (1995) (“Usurpation of the traditionally 
local control over education not only takes the judiciary beyond its proper sphere, it also 
deprives the States and their elected officials of their constitutional powers.  At some 
point, we must recognize that the judiciary is not omniscient, and that all problems do 
not require a remedy of constitutional proportions.”); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 
741–42 (1974) (“No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local 
control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential 
both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to 
quality of the educational process.”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 
1, 49–50 (1973) (lauding local control for “the opportunity it offers for participation in 
the decisionmaking process that determines how . . . local tax dollars will be spent.  Each 
locality is free to tailor local programs to local needs.  Pluralism also affords some 
opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational 
excellence.”); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“By and large, public 
education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities.”); 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) (“Full implementation of these 
constitutional principles may require solution of varied local school problems.  School 
authorities have the primary responsibility for . . . solving these problems; courts will have 
to consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith 
implementation of the governing constitutional principles.”). 
 54 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 744 (citation omitted). 
 55 488 U.S. 469, 501 (1989). 
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place in equal protection analysis.”56  However, desegregation prece-
dent has historically relied on the assumption that return to local 
control—a return to the authority of local decision makers who can 
best set policy for districts—is one of the main reasons to declare a 
district as unitary as fast as possible. 
In maintaining distinctions in school-level segregation, the Rob-
erts opinion rejects the “motives test” applied by Justice Breyer in his 
dissent of the opinion.57  Justice Breyer indicated that it was critical to 
look at the context in which school districts were choosing to use race 
as part of their admission criteria.  “If one examines the context more 
specifically, one finds that the districts’ plans reflect efforts to over-
come a history of segregation, embody the results of broad experi-
ence and community consultation, seek to expand student choice 
while reducing the need for mandatory busing, and use race-
conscious criteria in highly limited ways that diminish the use of race 
compared to preceding integration efforts.”58  Citing various prece-
dents, the Parents Involved majority maintains that their purpose in re-
jecting the motives test is due to the judiciary’s inability “to distin-
guish good from harmful governmental uses of racial criteria.”59 
Yet, this outright rejection of the motives of the local school au-
thorities in this instance is in direct contradiction to desegregation 
jurisprudence that urges lower courts to consider the “good faith ef-
forts” of local school authorities when making unitary status determi-
nations.  The Supreme Court has granted vast discretion to federal 
district courts to determine the good faith of school authorities when 
determining the adequacy of their compliance with desegregation 
orders, any ongoing responsibilities the district may have to address 
educational inequities, and school actions that have caused segrega-
tion.60  District courts often rely on the same factors that were pre-
 
 56 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 744–45.  But see Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative 
Action, Integration & Immigration Rights & Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary 
(BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1632, 1635 (2014) (using the Fourteenth Amendment to analyze the 
validity of whether voters may choose to amend the state constitution to prohibit the 
consideration of racial preferences with respect to school admissions, the majority held, 
“courts may not disempower the voters from choosing what path to follow.”). 
 57 Justice Roberts’ opinion refers to Justice Breyer’s discussion of “context matters” as a 
“motives test,” although Justice Breyer does not refer to it as such.  See Parents Involved, 
551 U.S. at 741–42, 835. 
 58 Id. at 835. 
 59 Id. at 742 (citation omitted). 
 60 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991) (“In considering whether the 
vestiges of de jure segregation had been eliminated as far as practicable, the District Court 
should look not only at student assignments, but to ‘every facet of school 
operations . . . .’”); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489–90, 495 (1992) (“Just as a court has 
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sented in this instance—the experience of the school authorities and 
the reliance on community consultants—when making determina-
tions on the legitimacy of court ordered desegregation plans.  It ap-
pears to be incongruent that the Parents Involved Court would reject 
the motives of local officials who are voluntarily enforcing integration 
plans,61 yet rely on the motives and good faith of these same local of-
ficials, even if vestiges of segregation persist in those districts, when 
determining if they have complied with desegregation decrees. 
In the instant case, seven years prior to PICS the Western Ken-
tucky District Court relied on the good faith of the Jefferson School 
District to release the district from its desegregation court order and 
grant it unitary status, even in light of a finding of an Equal Protec-
tion violation in its student assignment plan that barred assigning Af-
rican-American students to a magnet school in the interest of main-
taining diversity.  Moreover, the district was granted unitary status 
against the desire of the school district that argued that the latent 
demographic imbalances in the school system were vestiges of de jure 
segregation.62  Yet, the Parents Involved Court rejected the motives of 
the Jefferson School Board when it made the determination that in-
creased diversity was not a compelling interest sufficient to justify us-
ing race to make student assignments, simply because they were no 
longer under court order to desegregate.63 
II.  HOW DO WE GET TO “UNITARY STATUS?” 
JUSTICE JACKSON: “[P]rivate litigation will result in every school dis-
trict in order to get effective enforcement . . . .  But the judicial enforce-
ment remedy means just that, does it not, lawsuit after lawsuit? . . . What 
 
the obligation at the outset of a desegregation decree to structure a plan so that all 
available resources of the court are directed to comprehensive supervision of its decree, 
so too must a court provide an orderly means for withdrawing from control when it is 
shown that the school district has attained the requisite degree of compliance.”). 
 61 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 835 (2007) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting)  (“The context here is one of racial limits that seek, not to keep 
the races apart, but to bring them together.”). 
 62 See Hampton v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 370 (W.D. Ky. 2000) 
(“[T]he Board steadfastly maintained its desire for an integrated, nondiscriminatory 
school system.  JCPS has treated the ideal of an integrated system as much more than a 
legal obligation—they consider it a positive, desirable policy and an essential element of 
any well-rounded public school education.  This Court joins Judges Gordon and 
Ballantine in finding overwhelming evidence of the Board’s good faith compliance with 
the desegregation Decree and its underlying purposes.”). 
 63 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 856 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (“But if the [Jefferson County] 
plan was lawful when it was first adopted and if it was lawful the day before the District 
Court dissolved its order, how can the plurality now suggest that it became unlawful the 
following day?”). 
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are we going to do to avoid the situation where in some districts every-
body is perhaps held in contempt almost immediately because that judge 
has that disposition, and in some other districts it is twelve years before 
they get to a hearing?  What criteria do you propose?”64 
For years, the executive, legislative and judicial branches of gov-
ernment and academics have debated the reach and scope of Article 
III courts, particularly in the field of school desegregation.65  At the 
heart of these discussions lie the unique qualities that encompass the 
federal judiciary.66 
Although Supreme Court decisions are considered to be the de-
fining law by which all lower courts and legislatures must frame their 
decisions and actions,67 the pronouncement of school integration 
proved to be a decision that would have a peculiar effect on the na-
 
 64 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 13, at 254. 
 65 See, e.g., S. 3395, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1972 (providing for financial assistance to districts 
under judicial order to desegregate to be subject to certain restrictions with respect to 
time, distance, and the number of students involved in busing); Student Transportation 
Moratorium Act of 1972, H.R. 13916, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1972 (calling for a moratorium 
on federal court ordered desegregation plans that required busing, reorganization of 
school districts, and reassignment of students); MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES RELATIVE TO BUSING AND EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, AND 
TRANSMITTING A DRAFT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO IMPOSE A MORATORIUM ON NEW 
AND ADDITIONAL STUDENT TRANSPORTATION, H.R. DOC. NO. 92-195, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 
at 15 (1972) (purporting to clarify existing constitutional case law on school 
desegregation matters  and deal with “the fears and concerns” relating to busing issues, 
while the true intent of President Nixon’s message was rather to deny the federal 
judiciary’s power to enforce busing as a desegregation remedy); Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-
Federalist View of Article III:  Seperating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 
(1985) (mentioning the recent proposals to restrict federal court jurisdiction in the 
school desegregation context and offering a neo-Federalist interpretation of Article III); 
Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 581, 599 (1985) 
(discussing the debated role of the federal judiciary in bills on busing). 
 66 See, e.g., Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“No provisions of the Constitution . . . are more explicit and 
specific than those pertaining to courts established under Article III.  ‘The judicial power’ 
which is ‘vested’ in these tribunals and the safeguards under which their judges function 
are enumerated with particularity.  Their tenure and compensation, the controversies 
which may be brought before them, and the distribution of original and appellate 
jurisdiction among these tribunals are defined and circumscribed, not left at large by 
vague and elastic phrasing. . . . This was not due to chance or ineptitude on the part of 
the Framers.  The differences in subject-matter account for the drastic differences in 
treatment.  Great concepts like . . . ‘due process of law,’ ‘liberty,’ ‘property’ were 
purposely left to gather meaning from experience.  For they relate to the whole domain 
of social and economic fact, and the statesmen who founded this Nation knew too well 
that only a stagnant society remains unchanged.”). 
 67 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
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tion’s subsequent judicial and legislative judgments.68  In contradic-
tion to the Supreme Court’s history of expecting immediate national 
compliance with judicial verdicts,69 the Court ordered the lawyers in 
Brown I to return a few months later to answer questions about the 
scope of the influence and impact of its decision.70  Although the de-
cision in Brown I sought to offer relief to segregated school children 
for the harms they suffered, the Court set no standard or deadline for 
the desegregation of schools, and even contemplated whether it 
should allow citizens to gradually accept the ruling, whether only cer-
tain citizens should be subject to relief under the law, and whether 
the ruling should have a duration of enforcement.71  Ironically, in 
spite of holding that all citizens are guaranteed equal protection un-
der the law, the Justices avoided the responsibility of providing im-
mediate equal relief to all schoolchildren nationwide.72 
 
 68 For example, after refusing to follow Brown I and Brown II, the Governor and legislature 
of Arkansas argued that the states could nullify federal court decisions if they felt that the 
federal courts were violating the Constitution.  The Supreme Court unanimously rejected 
this argument and held that only the federal courts can decide when the Constitution is 
violated in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).  However, on the very day the Court 
announced the ruling, the Arkansas legislature responded by enacting a law permitting 
the Governor to close any public school in the State, thereby stripping local school 
districts of their decision-making authority so long as the Governor determined that local 
officials could not maintain a suitable educational system.  See Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. 
Bd., 187 F. Supp. 42, 44–45 (E.D. La. 1960) (holding all statutes that directly or indirectly 
required segregation of public schools unconstitutional, and thus invalidating the 
Louisiana legislature’s effort to resist integration by granting the Governor the authority 
to supersede any school board’s decision to integrate.); STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR 
DEMOCRACY WORK:  A JUDGE’S VIEW 49–67 (2010) (discussing the conditions in Little 
Rock, Arkansas post-Brown). 
 69 See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351–52 (1938) (holding that 
personal rights of equal protection cannot be denied due to difficulty of immediate 
remedy). 
 70 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495–96 n.13 (1954) (listing questions for the lawyers 
about implementation methods of a potential decision that segregation in public schools 
is unconstitutional). 
 71 Id. 
 72 See Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Education, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1928 (1991) (“The Court had achieved agreement on the merits 
[of Brown] in large measure because most of the Justices had a vague idea that they could 
avoid difficulty by allowing desegregation to occur gradually.  Yet . . . the more acute 
problem was that they never truly decided what they wanted the [lower] courts to 
accomplish [through judicial decrees].”).  But see Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative 
Action, Integration & Immigration Rights & Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary 
(BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1632, 1654 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“I firmly believe that 
our role as judges includes policing the process of self-government and stepping in when 
necessary to secure the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.”). 
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Consequently, a year after hearing rearguments from both sides in 
response to the questions posed, the Court decided in Brown II73 that 
schools were to desegregate “with all deliberate speed.”74  Since this 
decision likewise did not provide a clear timeline of when to elimi-
nate segregation, despite the Court’s prior decree that required inte-
gration of public schools, the responsibility for integration and im-
plementation had been left to local school boards and federal district 
courts to achieve.75  This notion of “deliberate speed” and veritable 
silence by the Supreme Court on the issue of desegregation76 from 
1955 through the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,77 served to 
 
 73 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. at 301 (1955) (“[T]he cases are remanded to the District 
Courts to take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this 
opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially 
nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases.”). 
 74 Id.  The Brown lawyers responded definitively that the Court should order the integration 
of schools forthwith.  See CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS 
ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 9–10 (2004).  On the other 
hand, the lawyers for the districts that were being sued argued that integration would 
cause irreparable harm to these communities; white hostility and violence would be 
rampant and the loss of employment of black teachers would be eminent.  Id.  
Oppositional arguments also included rhetoric that many black children were inherently 
retarded and bringing them into the schools would be detrimental to white students; 
venereal diseases and illegitimate children would increase as a result of school 
integration.  Id.  
 75 See Robert L. Carter, Public School Desegregation:  A Contemporary Analysis, 37 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 885, 889–90 (1993) (“Brown is the only case I know of where the Supreme Court 
found a constitutional violation but did not order immediate vindication.  Even after the 
‘all deliberate speed’ remediation ordered a year later in Brown II, the Supreme Court 
allowed school boards to dawdle in fashioning meaningful desegregation 
remedies. . . . Thus, from the start the message to the public was that the denial of equal 
educational opportunities to black students is not as serious a constitutional violation as 
other constitutional infractions.”). 
 76 The noteworthy exception to this silence is the Supreme Court’s forceful holding in 
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), ordering the desegregation of Little Rock, Arkansas 
schools after the Arkansas legislature amended the state constitution, under the doctrines 
of nullification and interposition, to relieve the state of the responsibility to follow the 
Brown decision.  See also Goss v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963) (holding that a 
desegregation plan that included a provision allowing students to transfer from a school 
in which their race was a minority to one in which it was the majority was in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and contrary to Brown I); Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 
218 (1964) (concluding that the closing of a public school in Prince Edward County and 
the use of state tuition grants and tax credits to support private segregated schools for 
white children unconstitutionally denied the plaintiffs equal protection under the law 
and were devices used to evade the constitutional mandate of desegregation). 
 77 Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits the use of federal funds in programs that 
discriminated on the basis of race.  42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Many have made the argument 
that Brown I was the impetus for introducing such sweeping legislation in 1964.  For a 
more thorough discussion of the theory that the fear of violence among the citizenry—
not the federal courts—had the most profound effect of Congressional action to bring 
about the 1964 Civil Rights Act, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:  CAN 
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legitimize the noncompliance and further delay tactics by state and 
local officials.78  Although the phrase “massive resistance” was coined 
by U.S. Senator Harry F. Byrd, the sentiment behind it was expressed 
by many states and local school boards toward the mandate of school 
desegregation.79 
Federal district court judges were charged with the responsibility 
to guide local school districts into compliance with the mandates 
from Brown I and II, without guidelines of how the remedies for Equal 
Protection violations would be implemented, who to include in the 
group of wrongdoers or wronged citizens,80 and how the judiciary 
would determine when the wronged parties were made whole.  This 
resulted in atypical remedies ordered for various districts.81 
 
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 157 (1991) (“[P]ro-civil-rights forces existed 
independent of the Supreme Court and could plausibly have accounted for eventual 
congressional and executive branch action as well as for Court action.  While we can 
never know what would have happened if the Court had not acted as it did [in Brown], 
the existence and strength of pro-civil-rights forces at least suggest that change would 
have occurred, albeit at a pace unknown.”). 
 78 See Frank T. Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since Brown v. Board of 
Education, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 10 (1975) (“In retrospect the Supreme Court’s 
heavy reliance on local school authorities and federal district court judges seems to have 
been misplaced. . . .”). 
 79 “Massive Resistance” was a policy adopted in 1956 by Virginia’s state government to block 
the desegregation of public schools mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court.  See J. HARVIE 
WILKINSON III, HARRY BYRD AND THE CHANGING FACE OF VIRGINIA POLITICS 1946–1966, 
112–14, 151–54 (1968).  The “Massive Resistance” policy reflected the views of many 
southern politicians who had a disdain for federal government intrusion into state affairs 
and believed that, if citizens were firm enough, the Supreme Court would reverse the 
mandate for school integration.  See Michael J. Klarman, Why Massive Resistance? 14 (Univ. 
of Virginia Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 03-7, 2003), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=410062 (“One cannot 
know how many white southerners genuinely believed that Brown could be nullified and 
segregation preserved.  But many southern politicians spoke this way, and constituents 
may well have believed what they wanted to. . . . A Louisiana legislator observed:  ‘When 
those birds in the Supreme Court realize we mean business, we’ll find we won’t have to 
change our entire school system.’  A South Carolina judge expressed confidence that ‘this 
decision will be eventually reversed, though it may take years.’  Countless other southern 
politicians insisted that desegregation would not come ‘in a thousand years’ or in their 
‘lifetime.’”). 
 80 One of the unusual things about Brown and school desegregation is that very few states 
and school districts have obeyed the ruling without being directly and immediately sued. 
 81 Countless types of integration remedies were ordered by district court judges since the 
Supreme Court did not proscribe a particular remedy for the legal violation.  See, e.g., 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 29–31 (1971) (holding that 
federal district courts could order busing to desegregate schools).  See also DAVID J. 
ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE:  SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 11–16, 161–63 (1995) 
(describing the conflict by various district courts in interpreting desegregation law and 
the various remedies that were ordered, including busing, school transfer policies, school 
choice methods, geographic attendance zones, and school closure). 
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In an attempt to quell the numerous surreptitious tactics used to 
evade integration cloaked as remedial plans,82 the Supreme Court of-
fered guidance nearly a decade post-Brown83 to lower courts in Green 
v. New Kent84 with six factors that should be addressed in school dis-
trict plans that would constitute a complete remedy:  (1) student as-
signment; (2) hiring and assignment of faculty; (3) hiring and as-
signment of staff; (4) transportation; (5) extracurricular activities; 
and (6) school facilities.85  The Supreme Court reaffirmed to school 
districts that “the time for mere ‘deliberate speed’ has run out.”86  
The Court maintained that “[t]he burden on a school board today is 
to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and 
promises realistically to work now.”87 
For nearly two decades the federal judiciary addressed significant 
issues related to school desegregation efforts in the South, while the 
North remained untouched,88 despite clear evidence of segregated 
 
 82 See, e.g., Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 229 (1964) (holding that the action of the 
County School Board in closing the public schools of Prince Edward County 
simultaneously supported the private, segregated white schools that took their place and 
denied black schoolchildren equal protection of the law and noting that “[t]here has 
been entirely too much deliberation and not enough speed” in achieving integration); 
Raney v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 443, 445–46 (1968) (holding that the freedom of choice 
desegregation plan for a school system was an inadequate method of converting to a 
unitary, nonracial system where no attendance zones were established and, after three 
years of operation, not one white child had enrolled in the all-black school and over 85% 
of the black children continued to attend the all-black school). 
 83 Very little desegregation was achieved in the nearly ten years post-Brown.  “In the South, 
just 1.2% of black school children were attending school with whites.  In South Carolina, 
Alabama, and Mississippi not one black child attended a public school with a white child 
in the 1962–63 school year.  In North Carolina, only one-fifth of one percent—or 
0.026%—of all black students attended desegregated schools in 1961 and the figure did 
not rise above one percent until 1965.  Similarly, in Virginia, in 1964, only 1.63% of 
blacks were attending desegregated schools.”  Erwin Chemerinsky, Lost Opportunity:  The 
Burger Court and the Failure To Achieve Equal Educational Opportunity, 45 MERCER L. REV. 
999, 1004 (1994). 
 84 Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
 85 Id. at 435. 
 86 Id. at 438. 
 87 Id. at 439. 
 88 See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 218–19 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“There is segregation in the schools of many of these [Northern] 
cities fully as pervasive as that in southern cities prior to the desegregation decrees of the 
past decade and a half.  The focus of the school desegregation problem has now shifted 
from the South to the country as a whole.  Unwilling and footdragging as the process was 
in most places, substantial progress toward achieving integration has been made in 
Southern States.  No comparable progress has been made in many nonsouthern cities 
with large minority populations primarily because of the de facto/de jure distinction 
nurtured by the courts and accepted complacently by many of the same voices which 
denounced the evils of segregated schools in the South.  But if our national concern is for 
those who attend such schools, rather than for perpetuating a legalism rooted in history 
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public schooling experiences for children.89  The efforts to integrate 
northern schools highlighted the dissonance between legal rule and 
judicial decision-making in forcing social change.90  The Supreme 
Court was forced to clarify whether the Constitution required integra-
tion or merely outlawed discrimination in districts and states that did 
not have legally sanctioned apartheid,91 but segregated experiences in 
practice.92 
In Keyes v. Denver School District, the first school desegregation case 
that involved a major city outside of the South, the Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of applying Brown in areas where de facto as op-
posed to de jure segregation existed.93  The Court found that alt-
hough there was no legal sanctioning of school segregation in this 
 
rather than present reality, we must recognize that the evil of operating separate schools 
is no less in Denver than in Atlanta.” (internal footnotes omitted)). 
 89 In 1968, 66.8% of all black children in the Northeast attended schools that were 
predominately black; 42.7% of Northern black children attended schools that were 90–
100% black. GARY ORFIELD, PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 
1968–1980, at 4 (1983), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-
education/integration-and-diversity/public-school-desegregation-in-the-united-states-
1968-1980/orfield_american-desegregation-1983.pdf.  For a more detailed description of 
national desegregation trends, see id. at xi-21. 
 90 Most northern states established public schools during the first half of the nineteenth 
century, but black students were not automatically privy to the full benefits of these 
public school systems.  In some states, black children were excluded from the public 
schools altogether.  In others, black children were relegated to separate and inferior 
schools.  Ohio, for example, excluded black children from public schools until the late 
1840s; Illinois did likewise until the 1860s.  Davison M. Douglas, The Limits of Law in 
Accomplishing Racial Change:  School Segregation in the Pre-Brown North,  44 UCLA L. REV. 677, 
685 n.17 (1996).  New York permitted the segregation of children in schools through 
legislation.  Id. at 685 n.18.  However, a few northern states—Maine, Vermont, New 
Hampshire, and Massachusetts—operated integrated schools by the mid-nineteenth 
century.  See id. 685.  See generally Paul Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment:  
Black Legal Rights in the Antebellum North, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 415 (1986) (providing a 
comprehensive overview of the condition of blacks in the North during the nineteenth 
century). 
 91 See, e.g., Spencer v. Kugler, 404 U.S. 1027, 1031–32 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(“Senator Javits recently summarized the problem:  ‘Whatever you call it, ‘de facto 
segregation,’ ‘racial unbalance,’ or ‘the absence of intergroup activity,’ it is a serious 
block to effective education for children of minority groups anywhere in the country, 
especially in the north and central part of the country where you don’t have the 
established social order of segregation.’”) (citing Emergency School Aid Act of 1970:  
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Educ. of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 91st 
Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1970)). 
 92 For a more complete discussion of the judicial distinction between the two notions in an 
attempt to maintain segregated systems, see Robert L. Carter, Rexamining Brown Twenty-
Five Years Later:  Looking Backward Into The Future, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 615, 619–20 
(1979) (discussing Judge Parker’s opinion in Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 
1995)). 
 93 Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 191 (1973). 
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school district, the Board of Education, through the enactment of at-
tendance zoning policies, created a separation of children by race 
within the district.94  Through this decision, the Court held all school 
districts responsible for practices that resulted in racial isolation in 
their school systems, including constructing schools in racially isolat-
ed neighborhoods and gerrymandering attendance zones.  Through 
this decision, the Supreme Court, for the first time, also recognized 
the rights of Latinos to attend desegregated educational settings.95 
The promise of nascent and expanded desegregation efforts96 ef-
fectively came to a halt with a series of Supreme Court decisions that 
followed from 1974–1995.97  The Court began to establish boundaries 
 
 94 The Court opined greatly about the discriminatory intent behind de jure versus de facto 
segregation.  Id. at 210–11.  But see Justice Douglas’ and Powell’s concurrences 
recognizing that there is no difference between the two terms.  Id. at 214–15 (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (“[T]here is, for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as applied to the school cases, no difference between de facto and 
de jure segregation.”); id. at 219 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In 
my view we should abandon a distinction which long since has outlived its time, and 
formulate constitutional principles of national rather than merely regional application.”). 
 95 Id. at 197–98.  See also Westminster Sch. Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774, 781 (9th Cir. 1947) 
(holding that the segregation of children of Mexican descent in California public schools 
was contrary to the laws of California and violated the Fourteenth Amendment by 
depriving the children of:  1) liberty and property without due process of law, and 2) the 
equal protection of the laws). 
 96 See e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25–30 (1971) (giving 
district courts the power to gerrymander attendance zones, provide interdistrict remedies 
in districts in communities where “white flight” resulted in a paucity of white students to 
integrate schools, and enforce busing as a means to transport students to schools that 
were not in their neighborhoods).  Many lower courts ordered remediation in various 
schools to help minority children make up for time in inferior segregated schools.  See 
e.g., Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd., 383 F.Supp. 699, 770 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (noting “[s]o long as 
the Constitution and laws are not violated, state school officials must be afforded the 
broadest latitude to meet their educational responsibilities”); Barrera v. Wheeler, 475 
F.2d 1338, 1340 (8th Cir. 1973) (examining questions relating to the lawful programming 
and proper allocation of funds to educationally deprived children); United States v. 
Texas, 447 F.2d 441, 448 (5th Cir. 1971) (requiring school districts to institute a study of 
the educational needs of minority children to ensure equal educational opportunities); 
George v. O’Kelly, 448 F.2d 148, 150 (5th Cir. 1971) (ordering the district court to 
consider whether achievement grouping or remedial programs during the regular school 
year result in racial segregation). 
 97 See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 99–102 (1995) (holding that the District Court 
abused its discretion in imposing a tax increase to boost a magnet school program’s 
attractiveness and discourage “white flight” from the inner city); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 
U.S. 267, 269, 290–91 (1977) (authorizing lower courts to order states to fund additional 
educational programs that would remedy the negative educational effects of prior 
imposed segregation); Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436–37 (1976) 
(holding that a District Court exceeded its remedial authority in requiring annual 
readjustment of school attendance zones in the Pasadena school district when changes in 
the racial makeup of the schools were caused by demographic shifts “not attributed to 
any segregative acts on the part of the [school district]”); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 
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and guidelines as to when school districts would be relieved of deseg-
regation efforts.  In Board of Education of Oklahoma v. Dowell,98 the 
Court for the first time attempted to put parameters around lower 
court rulings with respect to when a district would be declared “uni-
tary,” or no longer needing supervision because it operates under a 
legal system free of the vestiges of past discrimination.  The Court 
acknowledged that there was inconsistent application of the system 
that declared districts free of judicial oversight.99  The Court held that 
school districts would be declared as having “unitary status” by achiev-
ing parity in the six factors outlined in the 1968 Green decision:  (1) 
student assignments; (2) faculty assignments; (3) staff assignments; 
(4) transportation; (5) extracurricular activities; and (6) facilities.100  
Once the school district provided sufficient evidence to the Court 
that it was compliant in these areas, it would be declared unitary and 
would no longer be subjected to judicial oversight.101 
Nearly a year later, in the Freeman102 decision, the Court granted 
more leeway to districts that had been held culpable of Constitutional 
violations103 by holding that district courts could incrementally re-
treat104 from their supervisory functions before full desegregation 
 
229, 240 (1976) (remarking that the existence of “both predominantly black and 
predominantly white schools in a community is not alone violative of the Equal 
Protection Clause”); Miliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746–48 (1974) (holding that 
suburban districts could not be ordered to help desegregate a city’s schools unless the 
plaintiffs could prove that those suburbs had illegally segregated them in the first place 
despite some findings of intentional discrimination by both state and local officials that 
intensified segregation in the metropolitan area). 
 98 498 U.S. 237 (1991).  
 99 Dowell, 498 U.S. at 245 (“The lower courts have been inconsistent in their use of the term 
‘unitary.’”). 
100 Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968). 
101 Dowell, 498 U.S. at 250. 
102 Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992). 
103 The Supreme Court has consistently maintained that although district courts have the 
power to impose appropriate relief when constitutional violations are found on the part 
of local school authorities, local control of schools is a vital national tradition that must 
be maintained and district courts must return schools to the control of local authorities at 
the earliest practicable date in order to maintain true accountability.  See Dayton Bd. of 
Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406, 410 (1977) [hereinafter Dayton I]; Milliken v. Bradley, 
418 U. S. 717, 741–42 (1974); San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973); 
Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 469 (1972).  But see Robert L. Carter, Public 
School Desegregation:  A Contemporary Analysis, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 885, 891 (1993) (“The 
federal courts should not run our nation’s educational system, but they do have a serious 
obligation to stand guard for as long as it takes to ensure that the constitutional right of 
black children to equal education is fulfilled.”). 
104 For a more complete discussion on how Freeman permits nonunitary school districts to 
resegregate their schools and how such incremental resegregation can result in release 
from judicial supervision of formerly segregated schools which have yet to remove their 
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compliance had been achieved in every area of school operations.105  
The Court maintained that critical to the determination of whether 
school districts are in compliance and judicial withdrawal is proper is:   
whether there has been full and satisfactory compliance with the decree 
in those aspects of the system where supervision is to be withdrawn; 
whether retention of judicial control is necessary or practicable to 
achieve compliance with the decree in other facets of the school system; 
and whether the school district has demonstrated, to the public and to 
the parents and students of the once disfavored race, its good-faith com-
mitment to the whole of the court’s decree and to those provisions of the 
law and the Constitution that were the predicate for judicial intervention 
in the first instance.106   
The Court maintained that district courts should look to school dis-
tricts’ records of compliance to make determinations of whether ju-
dicial intervention should be relieved.107 
However, to the benefit of the children being served in schools 
under the court order, the Supreme Court upheld the discretion of 
district courts to exercise flexibility in the application of the Green fac-
tors that determine whether unitary status has been found.108  In Free-
man, the Supreme Court upheld the discretion of the District Court’s 
finding that the quality of education that black students received was 
inferior to that of their white counterparts because teachers in 
schools with a higher percentage of white students were better cre-
dentialed and had greater experience,109 and because per pupil ex-
penditure in majority white schools exceeded that of majority black 
 
racially identifiable characters, see Bradley W. Joondeph, Killing Brown Softly:  The Subtle 
Undermining of Effective Desegregation in Freeman v. Pitts, 46 STAN. L. REV. 147, 161–67 
(1993). 
105 Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 491 (1992) (“[U]pon a finding that a school system 
subject to a court-supervised desegregation plan is in compliance in some but not all [six 
Green factor] areas, the court in appropriate cases may return control to the school system 
in those [six Green factor] areas where compliance has been achieved, limiting further 
judicial supervision to operations that are not yet in full compliance with the court 
decree.”). 
106 Id. at 491. 
107 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249–50 (1991) (“The District Court should 
address itself to whether the Board had complied in good faith with the desegregation 
decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been 
eliminated to the extent practicable.”). 
108 Freeman, 503 U.S. at 492–93 (“The District Court’s approach illustrates that the Green 
factors need not be a rigid framework.  It illustrates also the uses of equitable 
discretion.”). 
109 See J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL 
INTEGRATION: 1954–1978 96 (1979) (describing the desegregation of faculty in schools as 
“the least visible and most flammable part of the entire school picture”). 
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schools.110  The school district was ordered to equalize spending be-
tween the schools and remedy the other inequities. 
Ironically in 1992, the first case to interpret the consequences of 
the Dowell and Freeman decisions was the then forty-year-old Brown 
case.111  In this instance, the Tenth Circuit very narrowly applied the 
Freeman decision and would not incrementally release the school dis-
trict from judicial review in its finding that the Topeka school district 
had not shown good faith compliance in its commitment to integra-
tion.112  The Court of Appeals opined “[t]o expect the lingering ef-
fects of legally mandated separation to magically dissolve with as little 
effort as the Topeka school district exerted, is to expect too much.”113 
After sixty years of varying levels of effort behind the integrative 
tenets of Brown I by the judiciary, federal, and state legislatures and 
the executive branches of governments, federal district, and appellate 
courts are now left in the untenable positions of finding congruence 
with the school district cases that remain on their dockets under judi-
cial order to desegregate.  The most recent holding by the Supreme 
Court in Parents Involved that voluntary plans that solely contemplate 
race conscious student assignments are not narrowly tailored to serve 
a compelling government interest places a new burden on district 
court judges who are deciding pivotal local desegregation cases.  The 
impact of granting unitary status to districts becomes even greater 
now that districts will be foreclosed from engaging in race-conscious 
decisions upon release from desegregation court orders. 
In the years since Parents Involved, scholars have speculated as to 
the long-term impact the case114 will have on the desegregation efforts 
of districts.115  For sure, even the Parents Involved Court disagreed as to 
 
110 Freeman, 503 U.S. at 483–84. 
111 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 978 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1992).  For a more complete discussion of 
the application of Freeman in this case and the ease with which Freeman allows districts to 
be released from judicial oversight, even when racially identifiable schools have not been 
dismantled, see Carter, supra note 103, at 892–93 (disussing the Tenth Circuit’s 
reinterpretation of Freeman after the Supreme Court’s 1992 remand of Brown). 
112 Id. at 592. 
113 Id. at 590. 
114 See, e.g., Erica Frankenberg & Chinh Q. Le, The Post-Parents Involved Challenge:  
Confronting Extralegal Obstacles to Integration, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1015, 1019–20 (2008) 
(positing that, in Parents Involved, the Court failed to provide a remedy for the problem of 
increasing racial isolation in K-12 schools); Alyssa M. Simon, “Race” to the Bottom?:  
Addressing Student Body Diversity in Charter Schools After Parents Involved, 10 CONN. PUB. 
INT. L.J. 399, 417 (2011) (stating “[t]he ultimate impact of Parents Involved may be more 
symbolic than critics of the opinion suggest”). 
115 Some in academia posit that desegregation is no longer a goal of most schools and 
therefore the Parents Involved ruling on voluntary desegregation efforts is moot.  They 
maintain that the greater challenge in modern day education reform is the battle in state 
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whether the outcome of the decision would have far-reaching ef-
fects.116  The social milieu is that far fewer districts nationwide are fo-
cused on school integration issues,117 and the judiciary now has less 
power by which to enforce remedial measures even over districts that 
are under court order.  It is clear that federal courts may not hold 
school districts under judicial court orders in perpetuity.118  However, 
the data continues to evidence that once districts are released from 
judicial oversight,119 they will resegregate.120  Given this context of 
fewer options available to districts to voluntarily combat increased 
 
courts and legislatures over school funding, school choice, standards and testing, and 
access to preschool.  For a more complete discussion on the broader implications of 
school desegregation and school reform efforts, see James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and 
Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV. 131, 132 (2007) (describing how the modern 
reform agenda of most school districts does not include racial integration, and has not 
for over twenty years). 
116 Compare Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 745 
(2007) (Roberts, C.J.) (“Justice Breyer’s dissent ends on an unjustified note of alarm.”), 
with id. at 863 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Until today, this Court understood the 
Constitution as affording the people, acting through their elected representatives, 
freedom to select the use of ‘race-conscious criteria from among their available 
options. . . . Today however, the Court restricts . . . that leeway.  I fear the consequences 
of doing so for the law, for the schools. . . .”) (citation omitted). 
117 Several states that do operate segregated systems, albeit those of de facto segregation, 
have focused their efforts on financial equity issues. See, e.g., M.A. v. State-Operated Sch. 
Dist. of Newark, 344 F.3d 335, 341, 352 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that special education 
services must be provided on a timely basis); Gannon v. Kansas, 319 P.3d 1196, 1251 
(Kan. 2014) (finding inequities in school funding throughout state schools); Abbott v. 
Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 411–12 (N.J. 1990) (holding that students in the poorest urban 
districts were deprived of their constitutional right to a thorough and efficient education 
due to the State’s failure to provide adequate financial resources for their educational 
programming); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, 801 N.E.2d 326, 367 (N.Y. 
2003) (holding that a state funding system failed to provide a sound basic education to 
the city’s school children in violation of the New York Constitution). 
118 Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249 (1991) (holding that that it is imperative that 
desegregation orders be dissolved once a school district has demonstrated compliance for 
a reasonable amount of time). 
119 Some district courts have also examined school districts that are under court order to 
desegregate that have desegregated and then resegregated while under court order and 
found that the subsequent racial imbalance while under court order does not constitute 
de jure segregation.  See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 478 (1992); NAACP, Jacksonville 
Branch v. Duval Cnty. Sch., 273 F.3d 960, 969–73 (11th Cir. 2001). 
120 See Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Brown at 50:  King’s Dream or Plessy’s Nightmare? 38–39 
(2004), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/
integration-and-diversity/brown-at-50-king2019s-dream-or-plessy2019s-nightmare/orfield-
brown-50-2004.pdf (showing that of the thirty-five school districts examined in this study 
that were released from judicial court order, a large majority saw more than a ten percent 
decline in the percent of white students in the class of a typical black student). 
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segregation since Parents Involved,121 what are the practical academic 
outcomes for students in these districts?  How will federal district 
courts maintain the spirit and mandates of Brown I while enforcing 
the mandates of Parents Involved? 
III. DOES DESEGREGATION MATTER ONCE SCHOOLS ARE DECLARED 
UNITARY? 
Mr. Rankin (on behalf of the United States):  “Now if you look back at 
the history of the schools in the North and also throughout the South, 
you will see that everybody was involved in the problem of “What are we 
going to do to educate the Negro?”122 
This Part identifies the school districts that courts declared unitary 
since the 2007 Parents Involved decision.123  The districts selected for 
review have been particularly identified in an effort to determine if 
there has been any change to their graduation rates since their re-
lease from judicial court order.  Justice Breyer in his dissent in Parents 
Involved 124 warned of the detrimental effects of limiting the power of 
school districts that choose to voluntarily engage in desegregation ef-
forts, including a decline in achievement test scores of children of all 
races.125  The importance that our nation has placed on high school 
 
121 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 865–66 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Yesterday, school boards had 
available to them a full range of means to combat segregated schools.  Today they do 
not.”). 
122 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 13, at 246 . 
123 The school desegregation opinions in this Part were obtained from both Lexis and 
Westlaw, two commonly used empirical tools for obtaining judicial opinions.  The 
searches include both cases that were published and unpublished.  However, there may 
be more opinions that have been rendered in this area of the law that are excluded from 
this survey because some District Court judges may have released school districts through 
oral opinions not reflected in a written opinion.  Additionally, a major limitation in 
tracking school desegregation cases is that the United States is not a party to every case; 
therefore, the U.S. Department of Justice does not have a compendium of all cases that 
exist with which to determine their progress.  See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 
BECOMING LESS SEPARATE?:  SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 
ENFORCEMENT, AND THE PURSUIT OF UNITARY STATUS  111–71 (2007), available at 
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/092707_BecomingLessSeparateReport.pdf; Wendy Parker, 
The Decline of Judicial Decisionmaking:  School Desegregation and District Court Judges, 81 N.C.L. 
REV. 1623, 1628 n.36 (2002); Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1157, 1195–97 (2000). 
124 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 839 (2007). 
125 Racial and economic integration at the K–12 level has been linked to considerable 
academic improvements, particularly for minority students.  Racially integrated schools 
“are more likely to have stable staffs composed of highly qualified teachers—the single 
most important resource for academic achievement, and to have better school climates 
(academically oriented peers, lower dropout rates, more parents with higher 
expectations) than racially isolated schools.”  PHILIP TEGELER, ROSLYN ARLIN MICKELSON, 
& MARTHA BOTTIA, RESEARCH BRIEF NO.4: WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT SCHOOL INTEGRATION, 
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graduation,126 and the societal consequences of our children not 
graduating from high school has been historically recognized by 
courts and social scientists.  Additionally, research has evidenced that 
only 64% of African-American children graduate from high school 
on time, as compared with 82% of whites.127  This disparity is particu-
larly pernicious in racially segregated schools.128  If graduation rates 
were adversely affected post-dissolution of judicial court orders, the 
evidence would support a finding that an educational interest in ra-
cially integrated schools is in fact a compelling one that would survive 
strict scrutiny.129 
Although state educational standards vary,130 over the past three 
decades public schools have been increasingly pressured131 to demon-
 
COLLEGE ATTENDANCE, AND THE REDUCTION OF POVERTY (2011) (internal footnotes 
omitted), available at  http://www.school-diversity.org/pdf/DiversityResearchBriefNo4
.pdf. 
126 See San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 113 (1973) (“Thus, in the final 
analysis, ‘the pivotal position of education to success in American society and its essential 
role in opening up to the individual the central experiences of our culture lend it an 
importance that is undeniable.’”). 
127 See THE EDUC. TRUST, THE STATE OF EDUC. OF AFRICAN AMS., available at 
http://www.edtrust.org/sites/edtrust.org/files/AfricanAm%20Booklet.pdf (describing 
the gaps that persist between black and white students in a K-12 school context). 
128 GARY ORFIELD, DROPOUTS IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE GRADUATION RATE CRISIS 64 
(2004). 
129 The Roberts decision in Parents Involved asserts that “[t]he [districts’ plans] are directed 
only to racial balance, an objective this Court has repeatedly condemned as 
illegitimate . . . [r]ather than to any pedagogic concept of the level of diversity needed to 
obtain the asserted educational benefits.”) Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 704.  See also, id. at 
843 (Breyer J., dissenting) (“The compelling interest at issue here . . . includes an effort 
to create school environments that provide better educational opportunities for all 
children; it includes an effort to create citizens better prepared to know, to understand, 
and to work with people of all races and backgrounds, thereby furthering the kind of 
democratic government our Constitution foresees.  If an educational interest that 
combines these three elements is not ‘compelling,’ what is?”( internal citations omitted)).  
130 Unlike the United States Constitution, which does not refer to education, many state 
constitutions require states to provide some level of “adequate” education to its citizens.  
See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 111–12, (1973) (“[I]n 48 of our 50 States the provision of public 
education is mandated by the state constitution.  No other state function is so uniformly 
recognized as an essential element of our society’s well-being.”). 
131 By the 2005–2006 school year, states who received funding under the Federal No Child 
Left Behind grant program were required to begin testing students in grades 3–8 
annually in reading and mathematics.  See Issues A-Z: No Child Left Behind, EDITORIAL 
PROJECTS IN EDUC. RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.edweek.org/ew/issues/
no-child-left-behind/.  By the 2007–2008 school year, they had to test students in science 
at least once in elementary, middle, and high school.  The tests had to be aligned with 
state academic standards.  Id.  States were required to bring all students up to the 
“proficient” level on state tests by the 2013–2014 school year.  Id.  Individual schools had 
to meet state “adequate yearly progress” targets toward this goal (based on a formula 
spelled out in the Elementary and Secondary Elementary School Act) for both their 
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strate increased educational accountability toward the students they 
serve.132  It has been noted in several studies that the impact of school 
level accountability policies have been particularly pernicious in pre-
dominantly minority segregated schools.133  State testing programs 
that regularly publish school level testing data frequently identify seg-
regated minority schools with concentrated poverty as low perform-
ing schools.134 Additionally, research has maintained that racially seg-
regated schools have lower graduation rates than do racially diverse 
schools.135  Given this information, it is critical to review the educa-
tional outcomes of students who attend schools that are released 
from desegregation court orders, since it is likely that those schools 
 
student populations as a whole and for certain demographic subgroups.  Id.  Starting with 
the 2002–2003 school year, states were required to furnish annual report cards showing a 
range of information, including student-achievement data broken down by subgroup and 
information on the performance of school districts.  Id.  By the end of the 2005–2006 
school year, every teacher in core content areas working in a public school had to be 
“highly qualified” in each subject taught.  Id.   
132 Department of Education Secretary T. H. Bell created the National Commission on 
Excellence in Education in 1981, directing it to examine the quality of education in the 
United States and to make a report to the nation.  A Nation at Risk – April 1983, DEP’T OF 
EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/intro.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).  
The Commission was created as a result of the Secretary’s concern about “the widespread 
public perception that something is seriously remiss in our educational system.”  Id.  
Since then, there has been a growing national focus on increased excellence and greater 
accountability in schools.  Id.  Most recently, federal initiatives such as “No Child Left 
Behind” and “Race to the Top” have mandated competency tests for students and greater 
reporting of outcomes by districts receiving federal money for education reform efforts.  
See DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www.ed.gov/esea (last visited Oct. 26, 2014) (focusing on 
policy initiatives undertaken by the department). 
133 ORFIELD, supra note 128. 
134 See Gary Orfield, Schools More Separate: Consequences of a Decade of Resegregation, HARV. 
UNIV. CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT 2, 12 (2001), available at http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/
ED459217.pdf (“Anyone who wants to explore the continuing inequalities need only 
examine the test scores, dropout rates, and other statistics for various schools in a 
metropolitan community and relate them to statistics for school poverty (free lunch) and 
race (percent black and/or Latino) to see a distressingly clear pattern.  The state testing 
programs, which now publish school level test data in almost all states, identify schools as 
low performing, many of which are segregated minority schools with concentrated 
poverty.  There is a very strong correlation between the percent poor in a school and its 
average test score.  Therefore, minority students in segregated schools, no matter how 
able they may be as individuals, usually face a much lower level of competition and 
average preparation by other students.  Such schools tend to have teachers who are 
themselves much more likely to be teaching a subject they did not study and with which 
they have had little experience.”) 
135 See e.g., Susan E. Mayer, How Much Does a High School’s Racial and Socioeconomic Mix 
Affect Graduation and teenage Fertility Rates?, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 332 
(Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991) (“As a school’s mean SES fell, as its 
student body became more economically diverse, and as its minority enrollment 
increased, tenth graders of any given race . . . were more likely to drop out.”). 
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either will resegregate,136 or even be released from judicial oversight 
already segregated.137  Since it is unlikely that the federal legislative or 
executive branches will make educational policy decisions with inte-
gration as a goal,138 such information will be critical for federal judg-
es, the sole branch with authority to impact desegregation efforts, to 
consider as they make determinations of whether districts should be 
returned to local control. 
The information presented in Appendix A is a compendium of 
the cases identified since 2007 in which courts made determinations 
of unitary status motions.  Additionally, the chart identifies some of 
the key issues that the court reviewed when deciding the motion, 
whether the district court compelled the parties in the action to at-
tend a status hearing due to prolonged inactivity in the case, and 
whether the United States government filed any objections to the 
motion for unitary status.  Lastly, the chart identifies the graduation 
rates139 for each district.140  Where available, dropout data were also 
included for the districts. 
 
136 See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, Historic Reversals, Accelerating Resegregation, and the 
Need for New Integration Strategies, UCLA CIV. RIGHTS PROJECT 5–6 (2007) (“Resegregation, 
which took hold in the early 1990s after three Supreme Court decisions from 1991 to 
1995 limiting desegregation orders, is continuing to grow in all parts of the country for 
both African Americans and Latinos and is accelerating the most rapidly in the only 
region that had been highly desegregated—the South. . . . Many of these segregated black 
and Latino schools have now been sanctioned for not meeting the requirements of No 
Child Left Behind and segregated high poverty schools account for most of the ‘dropout 
factories’ at the center of the nation’s dropout crisis.”). 
137 Courts will routinely excuse districts with segregated schools on the grounds of private 
housing choices, and nevertheless grant unitary status motions.  See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 
U.S. 467, 495 (1992). 
138 See ORFIELD, supra note 134, at 6 (“There has been no significant positive initiative from 
Congress, the White House or the Courts to desegregate the schools for more than 30 
years.”); see also GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION:  THE 
QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 16–18 (1996) (describing the 
opposition to school desegregation during the Reagan administration and, particularly, 
the hostility toward specific integration remedies such as busing by the Department of 
Justice).  But see Guidance on the Voluntary Use of Race to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial 
Isolation In Elementary and Secondary Schools, U.S. DEP’T OF J. & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (2011) 
available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/guidance-ese-201111.html 
(detailing the ways in which elementary and secondary schools can legally, in light of 
Parents Involved, pursue the compelling educational interest of reducing the very high 
level of separate and unequal schooling that may exist in their districts by drawing on the 
words of the Supreme Court to clearly communicate a range of legally and educationally 
sound approaches for educators and communities to consider).  Nevertheless, in spite of 
this progressive guidance, the administration has offered no policy guidance or decisions 
which have set integration as a goal. 
139 These data are limited solely to four-year graduation rates.  Additionally, these graduation 
rate data consider the rates of the districts overall, and do not take into account students 
who are graduating in alternate settings within the districts, including juvenile justice 
 
Feb. 2015] MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT 655 
 
IV.  TRENDS IN UNITARY STATUS MOTIONS DETERMINATIONS 
As Appendix A reveals, there have been twenty-four judicial cases 
since 2007 where decisions were published with respect to unitary sta-
tus motions.141  These cases involved desegregation orders in twenty-
three school districts142 in ten different states.143  Of the twenty-four 
cases,144 fifteen motions were granted unitary status,145 four were 
granted unitary status with prejudice,146 three were granted partial 
unitary status,147 and two were denied unitary status.148 
 
facilities or alternative schools.  Additionally, these data are not disaggregated by race, 
socioeconomic class or disability. 
140 Graduation data were gathered from individual districts and state department of 
education websites from the publicly available report card data.  Therefore, the amount 
of data available and the years for which the data are available are particular to each 
district and state.  In the cases of districts for which the data were not available online, 
individual state departments of education were contacted telephonically to obtain such 
information. 
141 An additional motion was granted in the case of United States v. Bakersfield City Sch. Dist., 
No. 1:84-cv-00039 OWW JLT, 2011 WL 121638 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2011), however, it was 
not included in Appendix A because the Bakersfield School District is a K-8 district and 
does not graduate high school students. 
142 Madison County, Mississippi; Tucson, Arizona; Houston County, Alabama; Phoenix 
Union High School, Arizona; Galveston, Texas; Chicago, Illinois; Shelby County, 
Tennessee; Little Rock, Arkansas; North Little Rock, Arkansas; Pulaski, Arkansas; 
Alamance-Burlington, North Carolina; Monroe County, Tennessee; Jackson County, 
Tennessee; Madison Parish, Louisiana; Caldwell Parish, Louisiana; Lowndes County, 
Mississippi; Evangeline Parish, Louisiana; Ouachita Parish, Louisiana; St. Martin Parish, 
Louisiana; City of Monroe, Louisiana; Morehouse Parish, Louisiana; Sumter, South 
Carolina; Franklin Parish, Louisiana. See infra Appendix A, at 2-16. 
143 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas.  Id. 
144 Some cases involved multiple motions for more than one school district. 
145 Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Arkansas, 664 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2011); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. 
North Little Rock Sch. Dist., 561 F.3d 746 (8th Cir. 2009); Robinson v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of 
Educ., 566 F.3d 642 (6th Cir. 2009); Anderson v. Sch. Bd. of Madison Cnty., 517 F.3d 292 
(5th Cir. 2008); Randall v. Sumter Sch. Dist. No. 2, No-3:63-CV-1240, 2013 WL 3786344 
(D.S.C. July 18, 2013); United States v. Morehouse Parish Sch. Bd., No. 69-14429, 2013 
WL 291578 (W.D. La. Mar. 4, 2013); Graham v. Evangeline Parish Sch. Bd., No. 65-11053, 
2012 WL 1833400 (W.D. La. May 16, 2012); United States v. Caldwell Parish Sch. Bd., No. 
71-CV-16751, 2011 WL 2634086 (W.D. La July 5, 2011); Williams v. Kimbrough, No. 65-
11329, 2010 WL 1790516 (W.D. La. May 3, 2010); United States v. Alamance-Burlington 
Bd. of Educ., 640 F. Supp. 2d 670 (M.D.N.C. 2009); United States v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 
663 F. Supp. 2d 649 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Smiley v. Blevins, 626 F. Supp.2d 659 (S.D. Tex. 
2009); Castro v. Phoenix Union High Sch., Nos. 82-302-PHX-RCB, 85-1249-PHX-RCB, 
2008 WL 324229 (D. Ariz. 2008); Fisher v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 549 F. Supp. 2d 
1132 (D. Ariz. 2008); Lee v. Houston Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:70-CV-1058, 2008 WL 
166954 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 16, 2008); Lee v. Dothan City, No. 70-CV-1060 WHA, 2007 WL 
1856928 (M.D. Ala. June 27, 2007).  See infra Appendix A, at 2–16. 
146 See  Taylor v. Ouachita Parish Sch. Bd., 965 F. Supp. 2d 758 (W.D. La. 2013); United 
States v. Franklin Parish Sch. Bd., No. 70-15632, 2013 WL 4017093 (W.D. La. Aug. 6, 
2013); Gray v. Lowndes Cnty. Sch. Dist., 900 F. Supp. 2d 703 (N.D. Miss. 2012); Monroe v. 
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A review of the graduation rate data shows mixed results, largely 
because eight of the motions were decided between 2012 and 2013 
and graduation data are not yet available for those districts. 149   Of the 
fifteen districts granted unitary status with timely graduation data 
available, seven have decreased graduation rates,150 seven have in-
creased graduation rates,151 and one remained the same.152  The dis-
tricts denied unitary status with relevant reported data has a de-
creased graduation rate,153 and the one district granted partial unitary 
status has an increased graduation rate.154 
Phoenix Union High School District reported its data by individu-
al school.  Of the fifteen high schools in the district, eleven experi-
enced a decrease in graduation rate,155 three had an increase156 and 
one maintained the same 100% graduation rate.157  While the gradua-
tion rates that decreased varied, it is critical to highlight that Suns Di-
amondbacks Academy has fallen to a 26% graduation rate; this re-
 
Jackson-Madison Cnty. Sch. Sys., C.A. No. 72-1327, 2010 WL 3732015 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 
24, 2010).  
147 Taylor v. Ouachita Parish Sch. Bd., No-66-12171, 2012 WL 4471643 (W.D. La. Sept. 27, 
2012); Andrews v. City of Monroe, No. 65-11297, 2012 WL 2357310 (W.D. La. June 20, 
2012); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 4-82cv00866-BSM, 2011 WL 
1935332 (E.D. Ark. May 19, 2011). 
148 Fisher v. Tucson, 652 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2011); Thomas v. St. Martin Parish Sch. Bd., 879 
F. Supp.2d 535 (W.D. La. 2012). 
149 Taylor v. Ouachita Parish Sch. Bd., 965 F. Supp. 2d 758 (W.D. La. 2013); United States v. 
Franklin Parish Sch. Bd., No. 70-15632, 2013 WL 4017093 (W.D. La. Aug. 6, 2013); 
Randall v. Sumter Sch. Dist., No-3:63-CV-1240, 2013 WL 3786344 (D.S.C. July 18, 2013); 
United States v. Morehouse Parish Sch. Bd., No. 69-14429, 2013 WL 291578 (W.D. La. 
March 4, 2013); Thomas v. St. Martin Parish Sch. Bd., 879 F. Supp. 2d 535 (W.D. La. 
2012); Andrews v. City of Monroe, No. 65-11297, 2012 WL 2357310 (W.D. La June 20, 
2012); Taylor v. Ouachita Parish Sch. Bd., No-66-12171, 2012 WL 4471643 (W.D. La. Sept. 
27, 2012); Graham v. Evangeline Parish Sch. Bd., No. 65-11053, 2012 WL 1833400 (W.D. 
La. May 16, 2012). 
150 Shelby County, Tennessee; Madison County, Mississippi; Houston, Alabama; Phoenix 
Unified High School; Little Rock, Arkansas; North Little Rock, Arkansas; Tucson, Arizona 
(however, the Tucson determination of unitary status was later reversed and the motion 
was denied).  See infra Appendix A, at 2–5, 7–8. 
151 Galveston, Texas; Chicago, Illinois; Alamance-Burlington, North Carolina; Monroe 
County, Tennessee; Jackson County, Tennessee; Madison County, Louisiana; Lowndes 
County, Mississippi.  See infra Appendix A, at 2, 6, 9, 11–12. 
152 Caldwell Parish, Louisiana.  See infra Appendix A, at 10–11. 
153 Tucson, Arizona.  See infra Appendix A, at 3. 
154 Pulaski, Arkansas.  See infra Appendix A, at 8. 
155 Alahambra High School; Betty Fairfax High School; Carl Hayden High School; Central 
High School; Franklin Police and Fire High School; Maryvale High School; MetroTech 
High School; North High School; South Mountain High School; Suns Diamondbacks 
Academy; Trevor Brown High Academy.  See infra Appendix A, at 4–5. 
156 Bostrom Alternative Center; Camelback High School; Cesar Chavez High School.  See 
infra Appendix A, at 4–5. 
157 Phoenix Union Bio-Science High School.  See infra Appendix A, at 5. 
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flects that thirty-six of the 135 eligible students in the cohort graduat-
ed. 
Although dropout data were not available for all of the districts 
reviewed, it is critical to note that of the seven unitary districts that 
reported increased graduation rates, three of them also reported 
their dropout data.  All three districts have reported increased drop-
out rates during the same time period that they have reported in-
creased graduation rates.158  Of the seven districts that had unitary sta-
tus motions decided in 2012–2013, for which timely graduation rate 
comparison data are not yet available, five have reported their drop-
out rates for the 2013 school year.  Two districts granted unitary sta-
tus have demonstrated increased drop-out rates,159 and one district 
granted unitary status has exhibited a stable drop-out rate.160  The dis-
trict granted partial unitary status in 2012 has a decreased drop-out 
rate.161  The district denied unitary status in 2012 has a stable drop-
out rate.162 
Of the twenty-four motions decided, the courts noted that there 
were no objections by the United States Government in seventeen 
cases.163  The United States objected to the unitary status motion in 
four cases,164 and in three cases, the plaintiffs and the defendants filed 
joint motions for unitary status.165  In four cases, the court initiated 
the review of the unitary status of the district after prolonged inactivi-
ty in the cases by both parties.166 
 
158 Monroe County, Tennessee; Jackson County, Tennessee; and Madison Parish, Louisiana.  
See infra Appendix A, at 9–11. 
159 Morehouse Parish, Louisiana and Franklin Parish, Louisiana.  See infra Appendix A, at 15–
16. 
160 Ouachita Parish, Louisiana.  See infra Appendix A, at 13–14. 
161 City of Monroe, Louisiana.  See infra Appendix A, at 15. 
162 St. Martin Parish, Louisiana.  See infra Appendix A, at 14. 
163 Houston County, Alabama; Tucson, Arizona; Phoenix, Arizona; Galveston, Texas; Little 
Rock, North Little Rock, Pulaski, Arkansas; Jackson and Monroe Counties, Tennessee; 
Madison Parish, Louisiana; Caldwell Parish, Louisiana; Lowndes County, Mississippi; 
Evangeline Parish, Louisiana; Ouachita Parish, Louisiana; St. Martin Parish, Louisiana; 
Morehouse Parish, Louisiana.  See infra Appendix A, at 3–4, 6–15. 
164 Madison County, Mississippi; Chicago, Illinois; City of Monroe, Louisiana; Franklin 
Parish, Louisiana.  See infra Appendix A, at 2, 6, 15–16. 
165 Shelby County, Tennessee; Alamance-Burlington, North Carolina; Sumter, South 
Carolina.  See infra Appendix A, at 7, 9, 16. 
166 Franklin Parish, Louisiana; Caldwell Parish, Louisiana; Ouachita Parish, Louisiana; St. 
Martin Parish, Louisiana.  See infra Appendix A, at 10–11, 13–14, 16. 
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V.  “WHAT’S A COURT TO DO?” 
Mr. Marshall (on behalf of appellants):  “The duty of enforcing the Four-
teenth Amendment is placed upon this Court . . . .”167 
Mr. Wilson (on behalf of the State of Kansas):  “[A]ny decision that this 
Court makes in this case will become the law of the case.  In that sense, 
certainly the entire matter is within the judicial power.  However . . . we 
are constrained to recognize a great deal of limitation and restraint upon 
that exercise.”168 
The U.S. Department of Education released a report indicating 
that during the 2011–2012 school year more than 1,200 local educa-
tional agencies, inclusive of school districts and charter schools in 
forty-eight states, self-reported that that they were under a federal de-
segregation plan that was either ordered by a court or entered into 
with the Office for Civil Rights under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.169  Those desegregation plans affect nearly 7.7 million stu-
dents.  These desegregation plans mandate a range of actions that 
districts must take, such as reducing racial isolation in schools, in-
creasing the diversity of faculty, ensuring all students have access to 
rigorous courses, and improving the quality of capital facilities and 
classroom materials.  Concurrent to courts making determinations on 
unitary status motions, research continues to illustrate that most dis-
tricts released from court orders to desegregate are rapidly resegre-
gating.170  Contemporaneous to these demographic changes and judi-
 
167 Transcript of Rebuttal Argument, Briggs v. Elliot, 342 U.S. 350 (1952), quoted in BROWN V. 
BOARD: THE LANDMARK ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 238 (Leon 
Friedman ed., 2004). 
168 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note13, at 268, 271. 
169 School Desegregation Plans: A National Census, EDUC. WK., May 13, 2014, 
www.edweek.org/ew/section/multimedia/desegregation-map.html. Notably, Hawaii and 
Nevada did not report to the U.S. Department of Education that they operated under a 
federal desegregation plan. Id. See id. for a more complete view of the total number of 
desegregation plans and the states where these plans are in effect. 
170 GARY ORFIELD, ERICA FRANKENBERG, JONGYEON EE & JOHN KUSCERA, Brown at 60: Great 
Progress, a Long Retreat and an Uncertain Future, UCLA CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, 27–30 
(2014), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/
integration-and-diversity/brown-at-60-great-progress-a-long-retreat-and-an-uncertain-
future/Brown-at-60-051814.pdf (exhibiting the decrease in enrollment of white students 
during the period from 2001 to 2011 and adapting the results demonstrated in Sean F. 
Reardon, Elena Grewal, Demetra Kalogrides & Erica Greenberg, Brown Fades: The End of 
Court-Ordered School Desegregation and the Resegregation of American Public Schools, 31 J. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 876, 899–900 (2012), available at http://cepa.stanford.edu/content/
brown-fades-end-court-ordered-school-desegregation-and-resegregation-american-public-
schools)). A review of the fifty largest districts to receive unitary status reveals that most of 
these districts are resegregating.  See ORFIELD et al. supra.  See id. for a more complete 
overview of all the states reviewed. 
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cial determinations, the legislative171 and executive branches continue 
to enforce various educational accountability measures for districts to 
meet.172  Yet in spite of the educational policies set forth at the legisla-
tive and executive levels to meet educational standards, veritably no 
policies have been set forth with respect to issues regarding segrega-
tion.173  Once again, in the face of moderate support by the executive 
branch,174 and veritably no support by the legislative branch,175 the 
 
171 Congress has not been able to enact any major federal education law since the No Child 
Left Behind Act in 2002.  See New Maerica Foundation, No Child Left Behind—Overview, 
FEDERAL EDUC BUDGET PROJECT (Apr. 24, 2014 3:55 pm), http://febp.newamerica.net/
background-analysis/no-child-left-behind-overview. 
172 The Obama administration awarded “Race To the Top” grants to states implementing 
innovative education reform plans and waiver polices related to the No Child Left Behind 
Act for districts that could not meet the set goals.  See Race to the Top Fund, U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC. (Mar. 25, 2014), www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/index.html, for more 
information on the policy guidance. 
173 While the Obama administration did take action in releasing guidance in 2011 on ways in 
which districts could take efforts to voluntarily integrate in light of Parents Involved, and 
the administration has been very active in supporting various ways to assess teachers to 
assure that students are taught by high-level educators, bold support behind school 
integration efforts has been scant.  See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Guidance on the Voluntary 
Use of Race to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Jan. 3, 2012), available at 
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/guidance-ese-201111.html. 
174 It should be noted that the Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Education and 
the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice under the Obama administration 
have been more active about enforcement of desegregation orders than they were in 
previous presidential administrations in recent history.  Cf. President Barack Obama, 
Presidential Proclamation—60th Anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education, THE WHITE 
HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY (May 15, 2014), www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/05/15/presidential-proclamation-60th-anniversary-brown-v-board-education 
(“Yet today, the hope and promise of Brown remains unfulfilled. In the years to come, we 
must continue striving toward equal opportunities for all our children, from access to 
advanced classes to participation in the same extracurricular activities. Because when 
children learn and play together, they grow, build, and thrive together.”); THE EROSION 
OF RIGHTS: DECLINING CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION (William L. Taylor et al. eds., 2007), available at 
http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2007/03/pdf/
civil_rights_report.pdf (criticizing the administration of President George W. Bush for its 
record on civil rights advancement and removal of the lack of authority of the 
Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division with respect to the use of race conscious 
voluntary integration by districts); The Bush Administration Takes Aim: Civil Rights Under 
Attack, LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS EDUC. FUND (2003) available at 
http://www.civilrights.org/publications/reports/taking_aim/bush_takes_aim.pdf 
(critiquing the Bush administration’s prioritization of states’ rights—and consequent 
limitation of the ability of Congress to enact civil rights policies—and use of federal 
authority to stop the civil rights policies with which they disagree). 
175 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 specifically removes racial integration in its definition of 
desegregation.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b) (“‘Desegregation’ means the assignment of 
students to public schools and within such schools without regard to their race, color, 
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goal of school integration and enforcing Brown v. Board, lies in the 
hands of the judiciary.  As noted in several of the cases presented in 
this Article, many of the unitary status motions were made only at the 
behest of federal district courts that requested an update from parties 
in cases who had not reported anything to the court with respect to 
desegregation efforts in several years.  Given the resegregation 
trends, particularly in the northern part of the country, it is impera-
tive that judges place the responsibility in the hands of the parties to 
continue their efforts to end the vestiges of poor educational oppor-
tunity.176 
An analysis of the cases heard since Parents Involved in this Article 
demonstrates that the Department of Justice does not always inter-
vene or provide guidance to the courts with respect to desegregation 
orders, even in the face of continuing segregation.  For example, in 
Chicago, the court was deliberate in asserting that despite evidence of 
the school district not providing a high quality education to students, 
the U.S. government had not filed a complaint in the twenty-eight-
year history of the case, despite the annual reports submitted by the 
defendants to the federal courts.177  Furthermore, in spite of a show-
ing of increased segregation and very little effort on the part of the 
defendant to make substantive changes in student or faculty assign-
ments, the Court of Appeals showed deference to the Shelby County, 
Tennessee motion because the motion was made as a joint effort by 
the plaintiffs, the U.S. government, and the school district.178 
Given the judiciary’s unique role of being the sole body with an 
opportunity to make an impact on the formulation of desegregation 
orders, and to force the continued enforcement and determine the 
scope and duration of such orders, it is imperative for the judiciary to 
have a full understanding of the impact of such decisions.  Although 
precedent precludes federal judges from allowing school districts to 
voluntarily enforce race conscious integration policies, it is of critical 
importance for the judiciary to grasp the impact of allowing racial 
segregation to persist, whether that segregation is de jure or de facto. 
 
religion, sex or national origin, but ‘desegregation’ shall not mean the assignment of 
students to public schools in order to overcome racial imbalance.”). 
176 Data indicate that in the 2011–2012 school year, the following states had the most black 
students attending schools that were 90–100% minority:  New York, 64.6%; Illinois, 
61.3%; Maryland, 53.1%; New Jersey, 48.5%; and Pennsylvania, 46%.  For more 
information with respect to the most segregated states for black and latinos, see ORFIELD, 
ET. AL., supra note 170, at 20. 
177 United States v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 663 F. Supp. 2d 649, 654 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
178 Robinson v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 566 F.3d 642, 650 (6th Cir. 2009). 
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Racial isolation in public schools is particularly pernicious because 
it is associated with a host of other forms of isolation that impede 
learning opportunities for students of color.  While it is evident that 
public school integration is not the sole means to address persistent 
racial and socioeconomic disparities in educational opportunities, 
the judiciary should be aware of the harms that are associated with 
such isolation; they are the very same harms that were admonished by 
the Brown court.  These harms include less experienced and less qual-
ified teachers, high levels of teacher turnover, less successful peer 
groups, and inadequate facilities.179  Research has evidenced for many 
years that students in schools with high concentrations of poverty suf-
fer from poorer academic achievement outcomes.180  Segregated pub-
lic schools are also less likely to offer Advanced Placement or other 
honors level courses that will make students better prepared for col-
lege study.181  Other factors—including expulsion rates, dropout 
rates, success in college, test scores, and graduation rates—are all 
more negatively impacted in segregated schools.182  Research has evi-
denced that even for states with the lowest graduation rates, the 
graduation rate for blacks and Latinos is still lower than 20% of the 
statewide average.183 It is just as evident today as it was sixty years ago, 
when the Warren Court decided Brown I, that the impact of attending 
segregated schools will influence a student’s status in life in immeas-
urable ways. 
In providing flexible latitude by which lower courts could apply 
the Green factors when making unitary status determinations, the 
 
179 Steven G. Rivkin, Eric A. Hanushek & John F. Kain, Teachers, Schools, and Academic 
Achievement, 73 ECONOMETRICA 417, 449–50 (2005); Charles T. Clotfelter, Helen F. Ladd 
& Jacob Vigdor, Who Teaches Whom? Race and the Distribution of Novice Teachers, 24 ECON. 
EDUC. REV. 377, 377–78 (2005). 
180 See Russell W. Rumberger & Gregory J. Palardy, Does Segregation Still Matter? The Impact of 
Student Composition on Academic Achievement in High School, 107 TCHRS. C. REC. 1999, 2020 
(2005); Caroline Hoxby, Peer Effects in the Classroom:  Learning from Gender and Race 
Variation 1, 35–36 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7867, 2000), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7867 (finding that the average socioeconomic 
level of students’ schools had as much impact on their achievement growth as their own 
socioeconomic status).  See James Coleman, The Concept of Equality of Educational 
Opportunity, 38 HARV. EDUC. REV. 7, 9 (1968) (discussing the impact on class structures on 
access to educational opportunity) 
181 See GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION:  THE QUIET 
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 233–34 (1996). 
182 See ROBERT BALFANZ & NETTIE LEGTERS, LOCATING THE DROPOUT CRISIS:  WHICH HIGH 
SCHOOLS PRODUCE THE NATION’S DROPOUTS? WHERE ARE THEY LOCATED? WHO ATTENDS 
THEM? 23 (2004), available at http://www.csos.jhu.edu/crespar/techReports/Report70.
pdf. 
183 See RUSSELL RUMBERGER, DROPPING OUT:  WHY STUDENTS DROP OUT OF SCHOOL AND 
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 77 (2011). 
662 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:3 
 
Freeman Court contemplated these “quality of education” factors, 
which can cause destructive outcomes for students if not regulated 
properly.184   
[Q]uality of education was a legitimate inquiry in determining DCSS’ 
compliance with the desegregation decree, and the trial court found it 
workable to consider the point in connection with its findings on re-
source allocation. . .  [I]t underscores the school district’s record of 
compliance in some areas but not others.  The District Court’s approach 
illustrates that the Green factors need not be a rigid framework.  It illus-
trates also the uses of equitable discretion.185 
In consideration of the unitary status motions before the federal 
judiciary since Parents Involved, it is evident that several judges chose 
to exercise this flexibility in equitable discretion.  For example, in Lee 
v. Dothan City Board of Education, the court noted that the district’s el-
ementary schools had achieved adequate yearly progress for two years 
under No Child Left Behind Act when granting the motion for uni-
tary status.186  With respect to the Tucson Unified School District, the 
court relied heavily upon the school district’s persistent achievement 
gap data in determining that the district officials did not exhibit a 
good faith commitment to the desegregation order.187  Moreover, the 
Court of Appeals in this instance held that the district’s commitment 
to address the issues in the future was not sufficient for a finding of 
unitary status.  Rather, the Court of Appeals insisted that the district 
show how it would address the issues prior to the grant of the mo-
tion.188  In North Little Rock, Arkansas, the court granted only partial 
unitary status to the district because of the lack of minority student 
enrollment in Advanced Placement courses.189  The court in Ala-
mance-Burlington County, North Carolina looked to a variety of fac-
tors when granting the unitary status motion, including student dis-
 
184 The District Court in Freeman examined the academic achievement of black students in 
the district and achievement levels of black students on the SAT.  See generally Freeman v. 
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992). Although the Court found no evidence of purposeful 
discrimination as it related to achievement levels, the court denied the district unitary 
status because it found that teachers in predominately black schools were overall less 
educated and experienced than were teachers in white schools and per pupil expenditure 
in predominately black schools was lower than in predominately-white schools.  Id. at 
483–84. 
185 Id. at 492–93. 
186 No. 70CV 1060-WHA, 2007 WL 1856928, at *3 (M.D. Ala. June 27, 2007). 
187 Fisher v. United States, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1164–65 (D. Ariz. 2008), rev’d sub nom. 
Fisher v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 652 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). 
188 Fisher v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 652 F.3d 1131, 1143–44 (9th Cir. 2011). 
189 Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., No. 4:82cv00866 BSM, 2011 WL 
1935332, at *26–27 (E.D. Ark. May 19, 2011) aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Arkansas, 664 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2011). 
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cipline, minority participation in gifted and talented programs, stu-
dent achievement rates, and graduation rates of minority students.190  
In Anderson v. School Board of Madison County, the concurring opinion 
took careful attention to note that the same harm of the current day 
segregation that existed as the Court granted the district unitary sta-
tus was just as deleterious as it was when the litigation began.191 
This level of flexibility with respect to quality of education issues 
allows district courts to ensure that motions for unitary status require 
evidence that school districts address the educational needs of stu-
dents to the greatest extent possible.  As such, when designing deseg-
regation programs, it is critical for district court judges to consider 
programs that could remain in place once the school district is grant-
ed unitary status.  If district courts were to require that school districts 
create programs that specifically addressed issues of low graduation 
rates among minority students in a school district, such programs 
could be designed to properly pass constitutional muster after a uni-
tary status determination. 
Any court ordered program that solely classifies students on the 
basis of race would not pass constitutional muster under strict scruti-
ny upon release from court order.192  Facially race-neutral policies 
could be implemented that assign students to particular programs 
and schools based on academic need.  Such a plan, on its face, would 
neither use racial classification as a factor for student assignments nor 
would it distribute any burdens or benefits on the basis of racial clas-
sification.193 
 
190 United States v. Alamance-Burlington Bd. of Educ., 640 F. Supp. 2d 670, 681–82 
(M.D.N.C. 2009). 
191 517 F.3d 292, 305 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he cruel irony is that racial isolation, albeit not as 
the product of de jure segregation, largely remains as foreboding and potentially 
deleterious as it was when federal court supervision began.”). 
192 But see Vill. Of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977) 
(holding that intentional discrimination can be shown when a facially race-neutral law or 
policy applied evenhandedly is motivated by discriminatory intent and has a racially 
discriminatory impact). 
193 Such a plan would be distinguishable from the policies in prior Supreme Court equal 
protection education cases in which the school districts or universities used racial 
classifications as the sole factor, or a factor among many, to make determinations 
regarding student school assignments or admissions to schools.  See e.g., Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 253–57 (2003) (examining a university admission policy based its 
system on points given to applicants for multiple factors including points awarded to 
applicants from underrepresented ethnic and racial groups); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 316 (2003) (noting that a university admissions policy that admitted students 
based on an evaluation of all the information in each student’s file, including an essay on 
how the applicant would contribute to the school’s diversity, reaffirmed the school’s 
commitment to diversity in an attempt to enroll a “critical mass” of underrepresented 
minority students); Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 275 (1978) 
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A school district’s use of the knowledge that minority students in 
its district are not obtaining the optimal level of educational out-
comes for future success (or even minimal level of knowledge to be 
fully functioning) in fashioning educational programs that would ad-
dress such remedial issues would not invalidate such a program post 
unitary status.  Equal protection law does not conflate knowledge or 
awareness of race with racial classifications or racially discriminatory 
purpose.  A racial classification194 occurs only when an action “distrib-
utes burdens or benefits on the basis of” race.195  A racially discrimina-
tory purpose would be evident if the school district adopted a policy 
at least partially because the action would benefit or burden an iden-
tifiable group.196  Therefore, designing a school desegregation policy 
with racial factors in mind that would increase graduation rates would 
not constitute a racial classification if the policy were facially race-
neutral and administrated in a race-neutral fashion.  The Supreme 
Court has never held that strict scrutiny should be applied to a school 
policy where race is not a factor merely because the school adminis-
trators were aware of or considered race when adopting the policy. 
It is critical for the judiciary to understand the impact not only on 
the lives of the children who are served in districts, but also on society 
at large that will occur as a result of the granting of unitary status mo-
tions.197  Further, the actions that are approved by the court while the 
 
(recognizing that the policy included a special admissions program that considered 
applicants who self-identified as minority group members and admitted a prescribed 
number of self-identified minority students each year). 
194 See United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 745 (1995) (noting that the record contained 
“evidence tending to show that the legislature was aware of the racial composition of [the 
districts where the plaintiffs lived]”).  The Court in Hays was also careful to note: “We 
recognized in Shaw, however, that ‘the legislature always is aware of race when it draws 
district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, 
and a variety of other demographic factors.  That sort of race consciousness does not lead 
inevitably to impermissible race discrimination.’”  Id. (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 
630, 646 (1993)).  It follows that proof of “[t]hat sort of race consciousness” in the 
redistricting process is inadequate to establish injury in fact.  Id. at 745–46. 
195 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007). 
196 See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (“‘Discriminatory purpose,’ 
however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.  It 
implies that the decisionmaker . . .  selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at 
least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable 
group.”) (internal citation and footnotes omitted). 
197 See, e.g., Santamaria v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., No. Civ.A.3:06CV692-L, 2006 WL 3350194, 
at *39 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2006) (discussing that, in an attempt to curb white flight, a 
school principal reserved certain classrooms for white students and assigned other 
classrooms specifically for Latino and Black students, “in effect, operating, at taxpayer's 
expense, a private school for Anglo children within a public school that was 
predominantly minority”). 
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district is under the court’s direction will have a permanent effect 
and will be favored, even if they have a disparate impact on the most 
vulnerable students. 198 
The members of the federal judiciary are experienced in the ap-
plication of the principles and precedents of equity; nevertheless, the 
dismantling of desegregation efforts of public schools has proved to 
be without parallel or analogue in legal history. 199  In view of the 
unique nature of this social revolution, it is not surprising that deseg-
regation cases have presented many problems that even sixty years of 
evolving equitable remedies have not resolved. 
Almost a decade after Brown I, Alabama Governor George Wal-
lace, in his 1963 inaugural speech, pronounced these words: 
Let us rise to the call of freedom-loving blood that is in us and send our 
answer to the tyranny that clanks its chains upon the South.  In the name 
of the greatest people that have ever trod this earth, I draw a line in the 
dust and toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny, and I say:  segrega-




Over a half a century later, we must ask ourselves, “was he being 
defiant or prophetic?”  The federal courts are now faced with the re-
sponsibility and honor to serve the American citizens in the legacy of 
the federal judiciary that relied upon resourcefulness, experimenta-
tion, straining the traditional equitable powers, and expanding avail-
able remedies to overturn Plessy.  It is evident that the legal transition 
from segregation to integrated public education took over a century 
 
198 See U.S. v. Franklin Parish Sch. Bd., No. CIV. A. 70-15632, 2013 WL 4017093, at *9 
(granting a motion for unitary status, court maintains that even though a particular 
school is segregated it cannot be a vestige of de facto segregation because the school 
opened under court’s supervision). 
199 Consider the fact that the Kansas Supreme Court struck down segregated schools in 1881, 
however, the Brown decision encompassed a review of Kansas’ segregated school systems 
in 1954, seventy three years later.  Further, sixty years after Brown I, in 2014, the Kansas 
Supreme Court in 2014 maintained that Kansas maintained wealth based disparities 
within the various districts of the State. See Bd. of Educ. Of City of Ottawa v. Tinnon, 26 
Kan. 1, at *20 (1881) (holding that the school board cannot establish separate schools on 
the basis of race.); Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1239 (Kan. 2014) (holding that the 
State created unconstitutional, wealth-based disparities in violation of the State 
Constitution). 
200 See JODY CARLSON, GEORGE C. WALLACE AND THE POLITICS OF POWERLESSNESS: THE 
WALLACE CAMPAIGNS FOR THE PRESIDENCY, 1964-1976 24 (Transaction Books, 1981); See 
also Leon A. Higginbotham, Jr., Violence in America: Contracts, Myths and History, 36 B.C. L. 
REV. 899, 904-905 (1994-1995) (describing the use of such outright defiance toward the 
equality of minorities used as the rallying cry for equal justice advocates). 
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to reconcile.  However, the time is now for our judiciary to make the 
legal truth of public school desegregation codified in Brown I a reality 
for all children. 
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Granted US Government and 
Plaintiffs objected 





(3) lack of racial 
balance in the mag-
net program; (4) 
facilities; (5) lack of 
“good faith” by de-
fendants because 
they had not been in 
compliance for a 
reasonable amount 
of time and because 
they have not creat-
ed an adequate pro-
gram to attract white 
students to the mag-
net program. 
 
Court held (1) white 
students are not 
attracted to the 
magnet program due 
to cultural and geo-
graphic considera-
tions; (2) the de-
fendants have shown 
“good faith” with 
being in compliance 
with consent decrees 
throughout the 
years; (3) district did 
not show bad faith in 
not reaching its goal 
of ensuring that the 
faculty within the 
district is within a 
15% range of the 
district ration of 
African American to 
white teachers by not 
forcing more experi-
enced teachers to 
transfer within the 
district; (4) although 
the baseball facilities 
at the predominately 
black school are not 
as nice as those of 
the other schools, 
there is less interest 
















201 ALABAMA STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 
http://www03.alsde.edu/accountability/preaccountability.asp (illustrating data obtained 
from the Alabama Department of Education website) (last visited Feb. 3, 2015). 
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by Judge Stewart 
admitted that it is 
undisputed that 
racial isolation con-
tinues to occur in the 
district for black 
students; although 
de jure segregation 
exists, the racial 
isolation that has 
remained is just as 
deleterious as when 
federal court over-
sight began. Judge 
Stewart warned of 
the harms that will 
occur when students 
will no longer be 
able to participate in 
the majority to mi-
nority transfer pro-
gram due to termi-








1058,  2008 








Granted The court offered 
very little dicta and 
rather simply states 
that the district has 
shown good faith 
compliance with all 
of the court decrees 
ordered and has 
removed vestiges of 
past discrimination. 

























































The District Court 
found that TUSD 
failed to make the 
most basic inquiries 
necessary to assess 
the ongoing effec-
tiveness of its student 
assignment plans, 
and programs which 





and providing an 
equal education to 
all students includ-
ing those attending 
all minority schools. 
The court held that 
TUSD ignored evi-




































































202  Id. 
203  TUSD STATS,  
https://tusdstats.tusd1.org/paweb/aggD/graduation/gradrate.aspx (illustrating data 
obtained from Tucson Unified School District website) (last visited Feb. 3, 2015). 
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tiveness of these 
programs in order to 
address demograph-
ic shifts in schools. 
 
The court found that 
the district failed to 
make a good faith 
effort to combat the 
demographic chang-
es in the district and 
exacerbated the 
inequities of the 
racial imbalance in 
its failure to assess 
programs. The court 
reviewed much of 
the achievement gap 
data from the district 
that demonstrated 
persistent gaps in the 
district. As such the 
court held that the 
district failed to 
make good faith 





The court granted 
the district unitary 
status upon the 
adoption of a post-
unitary  status plan. 
On remand  from 
the court of Appeals, 
(Fisher v. Tucson, 652 
F.3d 1131 (9th Cir, 
2011), the Court of 
Appeals held that 
District Court erred 
in granting unitary 
status and held that 
adoption of plan that 
merely promised 
future improvements 
was not sufficient to 
demonstrate past 
good faith in this 
instance. Upon re-
mand, the District 
Court held a special 
master appointed to 
develop a report on 
how unitary status 


















































Granted The court granted 
unitary status in 2005 
over the other eight-
een districts includ-
ed in the original 






204 Graduation data were only available for these years and reported by individual schools. 
ARIZONA STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, http://www.azed.gov/research-
evaluation/graduation-rates/ (illustrating data obtained by the Arizona Department of 
Education) (last visited Feb. 3, 2015). 
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suit, but maintained 
limited oversight 
over Phoenix Union 
High School District 
during construction 
of new high school—
Betty Fairfax. Since 
there was completion 
to the high school 
construction, the 
court ordered an 
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Smiley, et al, 
v. Blevins, et 





Granted In reviewing all of 
the Green factors, the 
court held that alt-
hough the district 
did not address the 
Court notes 














visited Feb. 3, 2015). 
206  Id. 
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TX, 2009) issue of good faith 
effort, they have 
been in compliance 
with court orders 
throughout the 
years—the district 
met its racial per-
centage goal be-
tween 1978 and 
1979, but was never 
able to meet such 
goals thereafter. Yet 
complete racial bal-
ance is not required 
to be granted a uni-
tary motion 






of the City 
of Chicago, 






Granted Court sated that US 
never filed a com-
plaint in the twenty-
eight year history of 
the consent decree 
in spite of the de-
fendant’s annual 
reports with the 
court detailing their 
remediation practic-
es to satisfy the con-
sent decree.  In 2008, 
the US filed a com-
plaint alleging ELL 
inadequacies in the 
district. The court 
maintained that they 
lack jurisdiction over 
ELL issues. The 
court contended that 
the school system 
does not provide a 
sufficient quality of 
education as likely 
necessary but held 
the policies were 
lawful nevertheless. 

























Granted The lower district 
court in this case 
found that the dis-
trict lacked unitary 
status in student 
assignment, faculty 
and extracurricular 
activities and granted 
only partial unitary 
status. The lower 
court held that the 
school district had 
not reported any 
desegregation data 
for years, that only 













207   Data is not offered for any years between 2003 and 2011. CPS Students Set Record High 
Graduation Rate of 65.4 Percent for School Year 2012-2013, CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS (Aug. 
14, 2013), http://www.cps.edu/News/Press_releases/Pages/PR1_08_14_2013.aspx. 
208  TENNESSEE STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 
http://www.tn.gov/education/research/dataavailablefordownload_000.shtml (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2015). 
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integrated, and that 
a lot of segregation 
was due to zoning 
laws and school 
construction. The 
lower court held the 
district made very 
little effort to inte-
grate; faculty integra-
tion never really 
occurred, and black 
teacher hiring de-
creased over the 
years. The district 
never submitted any 
docs about faculty 
placement, nor did 
the district submit 
sufficient infor-





Court of Appeals 
held that the ongo-
ing racial unevenness 
in student assign-
ment did not further 
subject the district to 
the court’s equitable 
powers. Court of 
Appeals reversed the 
decision of the dis-
trict court and 






in over 40 years of 
the litigation—rarely 
filed any opposition 
against the district’s 
plans. The dissent 
explained that the 
district court admit-
ted that they had 
been rubber stamp-
ing most of the mo-
tions during the forty 
year history of the 
case because no 
information was ever 
offered to show that 
the plans offered 
would have had a 













Little Rock Little Rock,  Unitary Status Court of Appeals None noted No Little 
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affirmed the District 
Court’s grant of 
unitary status for 
Little Rock Schools 
and the finding that 
the school district 
acted in good faith 







North Little Rock 
and Pulaski granted 
partial unitary status 
in all respects. The 
District Court ad-
monished Pulaski 
County for not in-
creasing minority 
enrollment in AP 
course, and not 










The Court of Ap-
peals granted unitary 
status for North 
Little Rock-- 
holding that they 
had good faith com-





cient evidence that 
they attempted to 
recruit from diverse 
job fairs, and their 
black teacher rates 
exceeded that of the 
labor market. 
 













































































209  ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, http://www.arkansased.org/ (last visited Feb. 3, 
2015). 
210  Great Ideas for Great Public Schools: Arkansas, Union Perceived as a Force For ‘Positive Change,’ 
NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION (Sept. 2009), 
http://www.nea.org/assets/docs/111012-arkansas.pdf; Barbara Moldauer, Stories of 
Closing Achievement Gaps Through Community Engagement, NATIONAL EDUCATION 
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district did not make 
a good faith effort 
with compliance 
because they did not 
comply with the 
reporting mecha-
nisms requested . 
Court held they 
merely showed evi-
dence that their stats 
looked better than 




















Granted Despite the joint 




respect to the district 
including racial 
school disciplinary 
rates; rates of partic-
ipation in gifted and 
talented programs, 
and racial disparities 
in achievement and 
graduation rates. 
The court held in 
spite of the contin-
ued existence of 
racially identifiable 
schools, the district 
showed good faith 











































The sole issue before 
the court was student 
assignment because 
all other Green fac-
tors had been previ-
ously satisfied. Since 
2001, the number of 
non-racially identifi-
able schools in-
creased; the court 
held this is not evi-
dence of de jure 
segregation. The 
court cited to demo-
graphic changes that 
indicated that that 
district was once 60% 
white and was now 
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ic change was so 
great that the in-
creases in segrega-
tion rates were due 
to demographic 
shifts not de jure 
segregation. The 
court held that issues 
such as student 
achievement and 
quality of schools 
were not  legal mat-






















































Granted The court held the 
district was 93% 
black and the school 
demographics were 
such that all schools 
have predominately 
black enrollment. 
The court held that 
nevertheless, the 
district has complied 
in good faith and 
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Granted District court re-
viewed Green factors 
and concluded that 
the district has elim-
inated all vestiges of 
de jure segregation. 
Court notes 




















































The remaining Green 
factors under con-
sideration for this 
motion were facilities 
and extracurricular 
activities.  The plain-
tiffs argued that 
there were several 
inequalities: unequal 
baseball fields at the 
schools; an unequal 
entrance to school; 
disparity in the pas-
sage rate for black 
students (although 
the district imple-
mented an AP exam 
process that in-
creased the number 
The Court 
noted that the 
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of black students 
taking the exam, the 
passage rate re-
mained low for black 
students); the con-
tinuation of the word 
“confederate” as a 
school nickname; 
and the playing of 
Dixie at school 
events. 
 
The court examined 
the Green factors and 
held student assign-
ments were equal-
ized; the baseball 
field and entrance to 
the school were 
fixed; and that there 
was evidence that 
black students had 
equal access to ex-
tracurricular activi-
ties.  The court ex-
pressed concern over 
the school nickname 
and playing of Dixie 
at school events, 
however, maintained 
that this did not 
represent official 
resistance to a uni-
tary system or a 
source of racial ten-
sion. The court re-
lied on the good 
nature of the super-
intendent and indi-
cated that his "heart 
is in the right place" 


















Granted District court holds 
that through report-
ing and concrete 
efforts that good 
faith compliance had 
been shown. The 
Court held there 
were still some 
schools that were 
racially identifiable, 
but court maintained 
that this was a matter 
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District Court grants 
partial unitary status 
with respect to facul-




ties. The court held 
that although the 
numbers of faculty 
and staff did not 
meet target goals, 
the district offered a 
non-discriminatory 
reason for its failure 
to reach such goals. 
 
The District Court 
held that although 
all of the schools 
were still racially 
identifiable, this 
disparity was due to 
geography and main-
tained that "aggres-
sive" tactics such as 
cross parish bussing 
would be counter-
productive to deseg-
regation orders and 















































al, v. St. 
Martin Par-
ish School 








Denied In this instance, the 
school district ar-
gued res judicata 
indicating that they 
were declared uni-
tary in 1974 when a 
judge called then 
unitary. The NAACP 
opposed saying that 
they were still under 
court order and 
provided evidence 
that indicated that 
very little happened 
after 1974 with re-
spect to desegrega-
tion. The District 
Court held that dis-
trict is still under 
court order. 
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ing that the student 
assignment plan left 
the southern part of 
the city just as segre-
gated as it was in 
1964.  Court held the 




patterns.  The plain-
tiffs argued that the 
district had done a 
good job of desegre-
gating the northern 
part of the city. The 
court remarked that 
plaintiffs had sugges-
tions for integrating 
the southern part of 
the city, but merely 
that the plans are 
not feasible. Court 
granted the motion 
for partial unitary 


















































Granted District Court held 
unitary status found 
in all areas including 
student assignment 
although the court 
maintained that the 
schools are not ra-
cially balanced. The 
court held that 
school assignments 
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Granted District Court held 
that any racial imbal-
ance in student as-
signment was from 
white flight and 
declining white en-












































three years and DOJ 
never filed any mo-
tions or had any 
objections until this 
instant motion.  DOJ 
argued that three of 
the elementary 
schools were out of 
compliance with 
respect to faculty 
assignments. DOJ 
maintains that the 
district can merely 
assign newly hired 
white teachers to 
those schools. The 
district maintained 
that they make 
teacher assignments 
according to teacher 
preference and they 
feared that if they 
assign teachers to 
rural black schools, 
the teachers will 
leave. The court held 
the racial facul-
ty/student ratio was 
set fifteen years ago 
and the law doesn't 
require strict com-
pliance. The court 
held that there is no 














































233  SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, http://ed.sc.gov/data/report-
cards/2009/district/s/D4317999.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2015).. 
234  LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 
http://www.louisianabelieves.com/resources/library/data-center (last visited Feb. 3, 
2015). 
235  Id. 










Key details  
regarding  














court noted that 
although schools 
that were integrated 
during earlier deseg-
regation efforts have 
now resegregated, 
they are not evidence 
of de jure segrega-
tion. The court held 
that schools opened 
under court order 
with the court's ap-
proval that are now 
segregated could not 
be held as de jure 
segregation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
